













Christopher J. O’Leary 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
 
Stephen A. Wandner 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 










Chapter 5 (pp. 131-210) in: 
Unemployment Insurance Reform: Fixing a Broken System 
Stephen A. Wandner, editor. 




Copyright ©2018. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
131
Chapter 5
Unemployment Insurance Reform 
Evidence-Based Policy Recommendations
Christopher J. O’Leary
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Stephen A. Wandner
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
and The Urban Institute
The federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system was estab-
lished under provisions in the Social Security Act of 1935. The last 
set of comprehensive system reforms addressing both benefi ts and 
fi nancing was enacted in 1976. The labor market has undergone dra-
matic changes in the intervening 40 years, and the UI system has 
not kept pace. There have been major declines in the shares of total 
employment in manufacturing, union members in the labor force, and 
full-time work as a share of all work, while there have been large 
increases in employment in the services, occupational licensing, 
and part-time and temporary work. Some federal UI statutory provi-
sions that worked in an earlier time have not aged well. This chapter 
reviews UI policy reforms suggested by research evidence in the con-
text of current labor market conditions. We examine the adequacy of 
benefi t amounts, durations, and access for experienced workers who 
become unemployed through no fault of their own. We also consider 
the suffi  ciency of funding rules to support adequate income replace-
ment. In this context, it must be noted that the federal UI taxable wage 
base has not been increased from $7,000 since 1983, and tax rates 
have eroded with the declining eff ectiveness of the experience-rated 
tax rate system. This chapter takes a fresh look at the UI research and 
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policy issues covered in our earlier work, Unemployment Insurance 
in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues (O’Leary and Wandner 
1997). 
The chapter starts with a research-informed review of policy 
issues, followed by a presentation of a comprehensive package of sug-
gested UI reforms. Our core proposals aim to renew the social insur-
ance principles upon which the UI system was based, programmatic 
incentives, and the fi nancing structure underpinning UI so that it can 
serve workers and employers over the long term. We also recommend 
updating the program to accommodate the realities facing American 
workers in twenty-fi rst century labor markets. An essential element 
of assuring long-term stability of the system involves balancing UI 
benefi ts and taxes over time, while also establishing a countercycli-
cal fi nancing structure based on forward funding. Our recommenda-
tions refl ect the principle of shared responsibilities of all partners in 
the system. In particular, we address benefi t eligibility, regular and 
extended benefi ts, benefi t fi nancing, administrative fi nancing, reem-
ployment services, and employment incentives. 
On the benefi t payment side, adequate benefi ts should be paid to 
eligible workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own. 
Eligibility should be off ered to bona fi de labor force members invol-
untarily separated from work, who are engaged in an active search 
for reemployment. Benefi ts levels should provide socially adequate 
income replacement that does not introduce excessive disincentives 
for reemployment. Benefi t durations should accommodate an ener-
getic and exhaustive search for new work with suffi  cient reemploy-
ment supports. 
Suffi  cient benefi t standards will increase costs for regular UI ben-
efi ts in some states. As a balance, we propose that the federal gov-
ernment should partially off set increased state costs by taking full 
responsibility for fi nancing an improved permanent Extended Benefi t 
(EB) program. Refl ecting the increased risk of long-term unemploy-
ment in the U.S. economy today, experience-rated employer fi nanc-
ing should be limited to the regular benefi t program, with the Federal 
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Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) levy covering the full cost of EB 
during high unemployment periods. It is appropriate that any future 
temporary emergency unemployment compensation continue to 
be funded from federal general revenues. We also discuss eff ective 
mechanisms for improved experience rating and forward funding of 
benefi ts together with a strengthened emphasis on reemployment of 
benefi ciaries. We restrict the scope of our recommendations to the 
UI program and its extensions and do not consider any means-tested 
unemployment assistance programs of the type recently proposed 
(e.g., West et al. 2016).
BENEFIT PAYMENTS
Federal UI law leaves it to the states to make their own statu-
tory determination about eligibility, benefi t levels, and duration of the 
basic “regular UI” program. Federal law is mostly silent about ben-
efi t provisions. The federal government occasionally has responded, 
however, to perceived misuse of state UI programs, placing restric-
tions on benefi t receipt by groups, such as professional athletes, 
school employees, and individuals collecting pensions. 
Eligibility
Monetary eligibility requirements are relatively modest in most 
states for experienced workers who work full time and full year. UI 
claimants generally have to have had minimum earnings in their “base 
period”—the fi rst four of the last fi ve completed calendar quarters—
before they became unemployed and have had earnings in more than 
one quarter. Prior earnings by UI applicants are considered evidence 
of labor force attachment, as well as an indication that tax contribu-
tions have been made to the system by prior employers to fi nance the 
benefi t system. Most states consider only prior earnings for eligibility, 
but some states also consider prior hours worked. An eligibility rule 
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based on earnings is easiest to apply. Most states have a high quarter 
earnings requirement and an earnings dispersion requirement. That 
is, at least one quarter in the base period must have earnings above a 
minimum level, and a suffi  cient amount of earnings must be outside 
the high earnings calendar quarter. Some states require no more than 
about $1,000 in the high quarter of the base period and at least $500 
in the second highest quarter.
Monetary eligibility is harder to achieve by workers who are 
recent entrants to the labor force or who are low-wage or part-time 
workers. Recent entrants to the labor force may not have suffi  cient 
wages to qualify for UI because their base period lags, and they would 
qualify only if their most recent earnings were used to determine if 
they are monetarily eligible. A number of individual states dealt with 
this issue by introducing an alternate base period (ABP), which uses 
all earnings in the four most recently completed calendar quarters. 
As participation in the labor force has changed over time, more 
people work part time. States have generally required unemployed 
workers to search for full-time work to qualify for UI. This restriction 
particularly aff ects older workers.
 In February 2009, Congress enacted the American Recovery and 
Reemployment Act (ARRA) that included UI Modernization provi-
sions that provided states with fi nancial incentives to change provi-
sions of their state UI laws in ways that would increase participa-
tion in the UI program. A $7 billion incentive fund was established, 
with each state’s grant amount set in proportion to the state share of 
national unemployment. States were paid one-third of their allocation 
for having an ABP for monetary determination of UI eligibility that 
includes the most recently completed calendar quarter. States were 
paid the remaining two-thirds of their allocation for having two of 
the following four additional program features: 1) UI eligibility while 
seeking only part-time work, 2) UI eligibility after job separations 
due to harassment or compelling family reasons, 3) continuation of 
UI benefi ts for at least 26 additional weeks after exhaustion of regular 
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benefi ts while in approved training, and 4) dependents’ allowances of 
at least $15 per dependent up to $50 (O’Leary 2011). 
The UI Modernization eff ort was successful at more than dou-
bling the number of states with ABPs from 19 to 41 and increasing 
the number of states adopting part-time work provisions from 6 to 28. 
Because states did not commit to permanently maintaining their UI 
Modernization provisions, one state later rescinded its ABP provision, 
and two states removed their part-time work provisions (Table 5.1).
Nonmonetary eligibility conditions cover both job separation 
and continuing eligibility. Rules require that the job separation must 
be involuntary, that is, not resulting from a voluntary quit, discharge 
for misconduct, or other causes justifi able by an employer. A notable 
exception has been earlier state legislation and a federal option for 
states in the UI Modernization incentives section of the ARRA of 
2009. That exception resulted in a total of 21 states permitting ini-
tial nonmonetary eligibility when leaving a job for compelling family 
reasons.1 For benefi t eligibility to continue for each weekly claim, 
the UI claimant must be able, available, and actively seeking full-
time work. Furthermore, to satisfy both the initial and continuing 
non-monetary eligibility rules, benefi ciaries may not refuse an off er 
of suitable work, including any bona fi de job off er resulting from an 
Employment Service (ES) job referral. 
Table 5.1  Unemployment Insurance Modernization: States with 
Provisions before and after ARRA
UI Modernization provisions
Number of states 
with provisions 
before ARRA
Number of states 
with provisions 
as of 7/1/2016
Alternative base period 19 40
Part-time work  6 26
Compelling family reasons  0 20
Dependents allowance  4  6
Training extension  0 13
SOURCE: www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/laws.asp#modern and updates 
from Suzanne Simonetta, USDOL, September 2016.
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High levels of state UI borrowing during the double-dip reces-
sion in the early 1980s led to tightening of eligibility requirements, 
and a falling share of unemployed persons who were insured receiv-
ing UI benefi ts (Burtless 1983).2 A common measure of UI recipiency 
is the ratio of the insured unemployment rate (IUR) to the total unem-
ployment rate (TUR). Figure 5.1 shows that this ratio declined from 
around 60 percent prior to 1980 to about 40 percent through the most 
recent recession. Since then, the recipiency rate has fallen to about 30 
percent nationwide, and several states now have recipiency rates far 
below 30 percent. A new dimension of the recent drop in recipiency 
results from reductions from the normal maximum potential dura-
tion of 26 weeks of regular UI benefi ts to shorter potential durations 
in eight states (see Chapter 4). Reasonable duration provisions are 
discussed below, but state eligibility rules and the fairness of their 
enforcement also are relevant. 
State policy and procedures have a substantial eff ect on UI receipt. 
It is possible that new automated systems for accepting UI applica-
tions and for qualifying continued claims are depressing recipiency 
rates. In fact, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), Civil Rights 
Center, fi led an initial determination supporting Florida complainants 
suing the Department of Economic Opportunity for discrimination 
because of the imposition of access and language barriers to the suc-
cessful fi ling of initial and continuing UI claims for benefi ts (USDOL 
2013). The 2015 IUR/TUR ratio in Florida was 0.148, one of the low-
est in the United States. Florida law requires Internet-only applications 
for benefi ts, its UI application call centers have been closed, and UI 
is no longer a required partner in local One-Stop employment centers. 
In 1976, the federal government enacted retirement income off -
set provisions, two decades before the surge in labor force participa-
tion by older workers in the mid-1990s. The legislation refl ected the 
expectation that older workers were likely to retire and would not 
really be looking for new employment. Today, however, older work-
ers are the only U.S. demographic group with a continued increasing 
labor force participation rate, and public policymakers are looking for 
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ways to continue this upward trend. Although states have discretion 
in applying the federal retirement off set provisions, they continue to 
work at cross purposes to the policy of encouraging older workers to 
stay in the labor force (Agbayani et al. 2016).
Suitable work provisions in state laws generally allow UI claim-
ants to search for work in their customary occupation at their custom-
ary wage. With the increasing severity of worker dislocation and the 
upward trend in the duration of unemployment, however, the likeli-
hood of returning to a customary occupation at the prior wage has 
been decreasing. 
Recommendations
Eligibility provisions should encourage unemployed workers to 
remain in the labor force and increase future employment and earn-
ings in the economy. Six recommendations are discussed below.
Figure 5.1  Ratio of IUR to TUR (Recipiency Rate) in the United States 
and among Normal and Shorter Potential UI Duration 
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Initial eligibility. Initial eligibility requirements should require 
moderate earnings in more than one-quarter of UI claimants’ ben-
efi t year. For example, some states require that earnings in the high 
quarter of the base period should be at least $1,000, and earnings in 
the second highest earning base period quarter must be at least $500. 
Alternative base period. Applicants for UI must demonstrate 
attachment to the labor force by demonstrating monetary eligibility, 
that is, evidence of suffi  cient recent earnings. The standard base pe-
riod  (SBP) for determining UI monetary eligibility is the fi rst four of 
the previous fi ve calendar quarters completed before application for 
benefi ts. For UI applicants who are not eligible based on the SBP, all 
states should apply a more recent ABP, which should be the four most 
recently completed calendar quarters. The ABP broadens eligibility to 
include a group of UI applicants who have earned suffi  cient UI earn-
ings but are excluded simply by the timing of their application. The 
UI Modernization provisions of the 2009 federal economic stimulus 
bill, the ARRA, provided fi nancial incentives for states to adopt an 
ABP (Table 5.1; GAO 2007). The ABP has been estimated to have a 
relatively low cost, at about 1.2 percent of regular benefi t payments 
(O’Leary 2011). 
Part-time work provisions. All states should allow workers to 
collect UI while seeking part-time work if their base period earnings 
were from part-time work. Similar to the ABP, adoption of a part-
time job search rule would broaden eligibility to a signifi cant group of 
American workers who have earned entitlement through labor force 
participation and earnings. This provision is estimated to have a cost 
on par with that of the ABP, at about 1.2 percent of regular benefi ts 
(O’Leary 2011). It also should be noted that part-time workers often 
hold multiple jobs for which UI taxes may be payable on their full 
wage base for each job. As a result, it is possible that the tax contribu-
tions for these workers actually exceed those for full-time job holders 
with much higher wages and salaries. Without this reform, many part-
time workers will continue to shoulder a disproportionate share of 
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UI benefi t fi nancing without enjoying the benefi ts of income security 
available through the program. 
Retirement income off set. The UI benefi t off set for retirement 
income should be repealed, given the great increase in the labor force 
participation rate of older workers. There should be no benefi t re-
duction for receipt of payments from defi ned benefi t pensions or for 
withdrawals from defi ned contribution pension accounts (e.g., 401k, 
403b, IRA, Roth, and Keogh plans) for benefi ciaries age 59.5 years 
or older, regardless of who made the original deposits to the defi ned 
contribution plan. UI applicants who have been involuntarily sepa-
rated from their jobs through no fault of their own and are actively 
seeking return to work should not be denied benefi ts or have their 
benefi t levels reduced because they are entitled to draw benefi ts from 
another source. Benefi ts from UI are an earned entitlement to be paid 
with regard to job separations, not a means-tested income transfer. 
Suitable work. Refusal of suitable work requirements in state UI 
statutes should specify a schedule for the acceptable wage by which 
the adequate replacement rate of prior earnings declines as the dura-
tion of unemployment rises. Unemployment caused by involuntary 
separations from employers is beyond the control of the worker. Un-
der UI benefi t provisions, jobless workers are expected to seek return 
to alternate comparable employment as soon as possible. The wage 
rate on a particular job is normally determined by market forces in 
the occupation and individual factors associated with unique features 
associated with the employer, the job, and the workers. It is not unrea-
sonable to expect full wage replacement at the start of job search, but 
it is important to recognize that unique skills associated with a partic-
ular employer or job may be worth less in new employment settings. 
It is reasonable to lower wage demands below prior earning levels af-
ter an initial period of search that yields no off ers at the old wage rate, 
because of the loss in value of fi rm-specifi c skills. Prolonged unem-
ployment could indicate a decline in job demand for the prior occupa-
tion. Naturally, vigorous in-person reemployment and job placement 
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services should be available to all UI benefi ciaries from the time they 
fi rst apply for benefi ts. The possibility of job training, particularly in 
incremental job skills that are in demand, also should be available. 
Nine states currently have nonmonetary eligibility rules that 
change the defi nition of suitable work during the benefi t year.3 For 
example, in Montana, suitable work after 13 weeks of benefi t receipt 
is a job that pays 75 percent of the prior wage. Of course, no unrea-
sonably low wage levels are acceptable under any circumstances, but 
the realities of the job market should inform reemployment eff orts.
Employment service staffi  ng levels. An active work search is 
expected of all UI benefi ciaries, and eff orts should be undertaken by 
the state agency to ensure this is the case. These include conducting 
the UI work test, the Worker Profi ling and Reemployment Services 
(WPRS) system procedures, and eligibility review procedures (ERPs) 
or reemployment and eligibility assessments (REAs). Based on past 
experimental evaluations, there are a combination of eligibility review 
procedures and reemployment services that should be used, for exam-
ple, as under the recently implemented Reemployment Services and 
Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program. Key to undertaking these 
eff orts is a vital and active public ES funded through the Wagner-
Peyser Act by the FUTA tax. 
Improved job search technologies are available through the Inter-
net, but economies gained through these systems have not replaced 
the professional human resources lost by ES since the 1980s. A fully 
competent and professionally staff ed ES is essential to providing 
eff ective reemployment services for all UI recipients, yet total staff -
ing levels in ES service delivery has declined steadily over the past 30 
years. One refl ection of the decline in the availability of ES services 
is the decline in the number of local offi  ces in which reemployment 
services are provided. As of May 2018, there were 1,478 full service 
One-Stop centers and 973 affi  liate offi  ces.4 ES should be a full part-
ner in every One-Stop center with staffi  ng of at least four full-time 
persons.
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Funding for ES staffi  ng should be restored to the real 1984 level. 
Funding was $740 million in 1984 and has fallen to only $644 million 
in 2016—or about 45 percent of the 1984 level in real terms. To reach 
full ES funding, the budget should have been $1.5 billion in 2017 or 
$856 million above the 2016 level (see Chapter 3 by Balducchi and 
O’Leary). Since ES is funded through Wagner-Peyser by the FUTA 
tax, reform of the FUTA wage base would support improved ES fund-
ing. The UI program should be restored as an on-site partner in One-
Stop centers, with ES administering an active UI work test and UI 
eligibility assessments. Furthermore, every state should have a central 
offi  ce administrative unit with at least 10 full-time staff  for program 
administration, including program management and program evalu-
ation. This central offi  ce unit would support a number of functions, 
including monitoring work-test enforcement, supporting reemploy-
ment services, and WPRS development and management. To support 
these and other uses of FUTA tax revenue, the FUTA wage base and 
tax rate should be suffi  cient to accommodate ongoing fi nancing of 
both 15,000 ES staff  and UI administration. 
Regular Benefi ts: Levels and Durations
The setting of both levels and durations of UI benefi ts has been 
aff ected by the fact that UI benefi ciaries respond in their labor sup-
ply behavior to the availability, level, and duration of UI benefi ts. 
Economists have made several eff orts to measure the size of these 
“disincentive eff ects.” 
Public policy to change the UI program benefi t structure should 
take disincentive eff ects into consideration. Decker notes, however, 
that even though researchers have found UI work disincentive eff ects, 
they have not reached consensus on the size and importance of these 
eff ects (Decker 1997, pp. 295–298). Woodbury and Rubin (1997, 
pp. 272–273) have a more defi nitive assessment in their review of the 
literature. They note that research on benefi t adequacy and consump-
tion smoothing suggests that UI recipients are overcompensated in 
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the short run and undercompensated in the long run, pointing toward 
variable replacement rates as a possible improvement in the system. 
They also report on evidence that shows increasing the potential dura-
tion of UI benefi ts by one-week results in an increase in unemploy-
ment benefi t duration of one day or less, and that this small response 
suggests that the average UI recipient is not abusing the system. 
Benefi t levels
The U.S. UI system is based on a consensus that the program 
should replace approximately one-half of lost wages. This level was 
not determined empirically. Rather, it was set low enough to encour-
age workers to search for work quickly and by taking into consider-
ation that unemployed workers would not have expenses that they 
would incur when they were working. Nonetheless, USDOL spon-
sored a number of benefi t adequacy studies in the 1950s. Early analy-
sis of benefi t adequacy revealed that benefi ts would be adequate if 
they equaled half or more of wages, prevented “too much” hardship, 
kept benefi ciaries from collecting welfare benefi ts, and would cover 
“non-deferrable expenditures” (Haber and Murray 1966).
More recently, economists have tried to determine how benefi t 
rules for the UI program should be structured. One line of inquiry has 
aimed to determine the optimal level of benefi ts to balance program 
goals for income replacement against work disincentives. Economists 
have agreed that UI benefi ts should replace considerably less than all 
lost income, because of work disincentives and the fact that added 
leisure time is valuable. However, there still is no agreement on the 
optimum wage replacement rate. Estimates have ranged from 20 to 65 
percent, with rates depending on assumptions about adequate levels 
of precautionary savings and forced borrowing by workers (Nichol-
son and Needels 2006, pp. 55–58).
Practical considerations require that there be a maximum benefi t 
level governed by social adequacy considerations. High wage work-
ers (e.g., earning $5,000 a week) are not going to get weekly benefi t 
amounts of $2,500. States set the maximum benefi t amount either as a 
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fi xed amount that must be adjusted periodically by the state legislature 
or an amount that automatically increases over time, generally tied to 
the state average weekly wage (AWW) in UI-covered employment. 
The federal Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation rec-
ommended a benefi t standard such that the maximum benefi t level 
would be indexed to two-thirds of a state’s average weekly wage in 
UI-covered employment (ACUC 1996, p. 242). No such standard has 
been enacted, and most states would not meet the proposed standard.
Duration of benefi ts
When states fi rst paid UI benefi ts under the Social Security Act in 
1938, weekly benefi t amounts were small, and durations were short 
because the program was new and actuarial estimates were uncertain 
as the Great Depression continued. 
Fortunately, the actuarial estimates of the mid-1930s were overly 
pessimistic. The potential entitled duration of UI increased steadily 
among states from the program origins in the 1930s through the late 
1950s (O’Leary 2013). After World War II, states found that they 
could aff ord to pay more benefi ts, and by the mid-1970s, an “Ameri-
can consensus” had emerged (O’Leary and Wandner 1997). All states 
paid at least 26 weeks of regular UI benefi ts to experienced work-
ers who were unemployed through no fault of their own. Eligibil-
ity conditions varied by state, but states paid UI in the amount of 
approximately half of a worker’s prior wage up to a maximum benefi t 
amount to workers who were actively seeking reemployment. Benefi t 
payment provision generosity varied by state and by region. 
By 2010, all states had provided potential UI durations of at least 
26 weeks for more than 50 years.5 In response to the Great Reces-
sion, starting in December 2010, however, the American consensus 
broke down. A substantial minority of states have raised eligibility 
standards and lowered potential durations to less than 26 weeks. The 
eight states that cut maximum potential durations were primarily 
motivated by the heavy levels of UI debt that they had incurred during 
the Great Recession.6 The new state legislation was designed to cut 
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future UI costs, not because there was agreement that paying benefi ts 
for a shorter duration would be suffi  cient for workers to search for and 
fi nd employment. 
During normal economic conditions, most transitions to new 
jobs, after involuntary job loss, occur within 13 weeks, and almost all 
transitions happen within 26 weeks. The high exhaustion rates of UI 
benefi t entitlements during and after the long and deep Great Reces-
sion led to historically high average durations of benefi t receipt and 
caused massive state borrowing to pay regular UI benefi ts. Thirty-six 
of 53 state UI programs needed loans to pay regular UI benefi ts dur-
ing the Great Recession. At the end of 2010, the system was $29 bil-
lion in debt. The federal unemployment trust fund reached a modest 
$2 billion net surplus at the end of 2013, but as of January 2016, 10 
states still had outstanding private market loans or bond debts, declin-
ing to 5 states by January 2018.7 The eight states that cut potential 
durations improved their reserve positions faster than they otherwise 
would have, but the reductions in potential durations in these states 
have eroded the fundamental intent of UI to provide temporary partial 
wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers. The shorter 
limits on potential durations could curtail productive job search and 
result in inferior job matches, resulting in lower productivity and 
states failing to fully benefi t from the talents of their citizens. 
Recommendations
Benefi t levels. Consistent with earlier proposals for benefi t level 
standards, states should pay benefi ts that replace 50 percent of lost 
wages up to a maximum set at two-thirds of the state AWW in UI-
covered employment. Having a maximum of two-thirds of the AWW 
will ensure that approximately 80 percent of benefi ciaries will receive 
at least one-half wage replacement while receiving regular UI bene-
fi ts. This standard was most recently endorsed by the Advisory Coun-
cil on Unemployment Compensation (1996). However, no standard 
for the weekly benefi t amount has ever been set in federal statute as a 
state conformity requirement (Blaustein 1993, pp. 211–212, p. 241). 
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Several strands of research support the 50 percent wage replace-
ment standard as the proper balance of adequate wage replacement 
while avoiding excessive work disincentives. For example, literature 
on household expenditures, consumption smoothing, optimal UI, 
compensating wage diff erentials, and consumer choice theory all sup-
port 50 percent wage replacement (O’Leary 1998, pp. 65–75).8 
Duration. States should provide adequate regular weekly UI 
benefi t payments for at least 26 weeks through employer fi nancing. 
Eligibility provisions should accommodate modern workforce pat-
terns including increased part-time work and sharply increased rates 
of labor force participation by older workers. Benefi t provisions also 
should accommodate labor market realities, particularly for persons 
in part-time, low wage, and low skill jobs.
Permanent Extended Benefi ts and Temporary 
Emergency Compensation
The basic 26-week regular UI program can be considered ade-
quate in periods of low unemployment. Starting in the 1950s, how-
ever, Congress found regular UI to be inadequate when unemployment 
rises and more workers exhaust their entitlement benefi ts. Congress 
reacted in 1958 and 1961 by enacting emergency EB programs to 
fi ll a temporary need for additional UI benefi ts during a recession. In 
1970, Congress enacted a permanent EB program designed to elimi-
nate the need for temporary extensions. The EB program set triggers 
for payments based on the level of unemployment, and the benefi ts 
were equally fi nanced by the state and federal governments. Unfor-
tunately, the EB program has not actively functioned as originally 
intended for the past 40 years.
Originally, the EB program was a good example of federal-state 
cooperation.9 However, for many years, because of low UI recipiency 
rates, the triggers based on insured unemployment rarely activated 
EB as total unemployment rose (Nicholson and Needels 2006). Under 
the original 1970 law, EB could be activated by a national trigger 
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aff ecting all states or a state-level trigger aff ecting EB only in that 
particular state. In the early 1980s, cost-cutting federal legislation 
eliminated the national trigger, and the state trigger threshold was 
raised from 4.0 to 5.0 percent insured unemployment rate (Woodbury 
and Rubin 1997). Additionally, increasing eligibility requirements in 
some states resulted in low UI recipiency rates and low IURs that 
failed to trigger EB even when the TUR had risen quite high (Blank 
and Card 1991). In response to this failure in more than a few states 
during the early 1990s recession, Congress enacted legislation in July 
1992 allowing states to adopt an alternative trigger based on TUR as 
estimated by the Current Population Survey. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, emergency federal UI extensions were 
structured to be paid before any EB that might be available. The 
ARRA of 2009 provided temporary 100 percent federal reimburse-
ment of EB payments for states that adopted alternative EB trig-
gers based on the TUR. The 100 percent EB payment was continued 
through December 31, 2013, in states with conforming TUR triggers. 
During the Great Recession, EB became eff ective in all states that 
adopted TUR triggers, but a survey of states revealed that almost all 
TUR adopters said they would return to IUR triggers after the 100 
percent federal funding ended (Mastri et al. 2016). 
Despite the fact that EB is a permanent program with a statu-
tory basis, Congress has enacted additional emergency programs in 
response to all six economic recessions since 1971. These discretion-
ary emergency extensions were similar to Congressional actions in 
1958 and 1961 and were preferred by states over EB, because all were 
fully federally funded. Both the EB and the emergency extensions 
lengthened the potential duration of benefi ts, but until 2009 the total 
was never greater than 72 weeks and was frequently not greater than 
52 weeks. 
Just as the Great Recession was unprecedented in it severity, 
the extension durations also were unprecedented. During the Great 
Recession, the combination of the three UI programs yielded a maxi-
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mum potential duration of benefi ts that reached 99 weeks in some 
states from early 2009 through late 2012 (USDOL n. d.).
Research
Research evidence suggests that the EB system should be revised. 
IUR triggers operated eff ectively for a brief period in the early 1970s, 
but given the low UI recipiency rates nationwide, IUR triggers are 
no longer responsive to surges in unemployment. Even though Con-
gress enacted an optional TUR trigger, not all states have adopted or 
retained it because states pay for half the EB costs, thus increasing 
state UI expenditures.
Because maximum potential UI durations were raised to as high 
as 99 weeks during and after the Great Recession, some policy ana-
lysts and politicians have raised old concerns about the moral haz-
ard eff ect of UI benefi ts unnecessarily prolonging unemployment 
(Decker 1997). That is, UI benefi ts act as a disincentive to return to 
work. Although good estimates of the magnitude of this eff ect have 
been known for many years, concern about it was magnifi ed by the 
unprecedented increase in the potential duration of UI benefi ts during 
the Great Recession.
Estimates of the labor supply disincentive eff ects suggest that 
reduced job search eff orts by UI recipients may have contributed to an 
increase in the unemployment rate.10 The estimated eff ects of the UI 
expansions on the unemployment rate, however, are somewhat mod-
est, ranging from 0.3 percentage point of the 5.5 percentage-point 
recessionary increase in the unemployment rate (Rothstein 2012) to 
approximately 1 percentage point (Mazumder 2011). Another study 
(Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin 2010) essentially split the diff erence, sug-
gesting that the 2008 emergency unemployment benefi ts program 
increased the unemployment rate by approximately 0.7 percentage 
point.
It is important to distinguish between UI’s eff ect on the unem-
ployment rate and its eff ects on unemployment and economic activity. 
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For example, part of the rise in the unemployment rate is caused by 
the increased labor force participation of UI recipients. Without UI 
benefi ts, some jobless workers would have stopped looking for work 
and thus would not have been counted as unemployed. Katz (2010) 
cites a number of positive off setting impacts of the UI program, 
including consumption smoothing eff ects for unemployed workers, 
spillover eff ects of shorter spells of unemployment for workers not 
receiving UI benefi ts, the macroeconomic stimulation of the econ-
omy from expenditures made with UI benefi ts, and long-term posi-
tive impacts of UI by keeping workers in the labor force rather than 
encouraging them to leave.
The UI program had a signifi cant macroeconomic eff ect on the 
U.S. economy during the Great Recession. The increase in UI benefi t 
payments during the recession represented a signifi cant portion of the 
economic stimulus provided by the ARRA and other UI extensions. 
The Congressional Budget Offi  ce (2012) estimated that each dollar 
spent on extended UI benefi ts generated $1.90 in increased economic 
activity. Burtless and Gordon (2011) state that UI is a particularly 
eff ective form of targeting economic stimulus funds for both equity 
and practical reasons. The equity argument is that unemployed work-
ers suff er the biggest income loss, while the practical argument relates 
to eff ectiveness, since these individuals are more likely to spend and 
spend quickly. Burtless and Gordon also point out that even though 
potential UI benefi t durations reached unprecedented levels during 
the recession, the United States normally is at the bottom of the list 
of industrial nations with respect to UI duration. Even at 99 weeks, 
the U.S. potential duration was approximately equal to that of Spain, 
Portugal, Norway, Finland, and France, and below Australia, New 
Zealand, and Belgium. 
Recommendations
During the Great Recession, the federal government agreed to 
pay the full cost of EB initiated and ended by a TUR trigger. This 
practice should be a permanent feature of the federal-state UI system, 
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but it should be conditional upon states providing adequate amounts 
and durations of regular UI benefi ts. Making the federal partner per-
manently responsible for the cost of EB should establish a quid pro 
quo with the states responsible for paying the full cost of up to 26 
weeks of regular UI benefi ts, that is, enacting federal UI benefi t stan-
dards.11 The EB program would then be fully funded by the federal 
share of revenues from the FUTA tax. The EB program is currently 50 
percent fi nanced by states, with the federal partner paying the other 
half with revenues from the federal share of FUTA taxes. The result 
of changing the EB program in this manner would be the provision of 
more adequate UI benefi ts in good and bad economic times, without 
unduly burdening state fi nancial resources.
Permanent EB, with federal fi nancing from FUTA, should pro-
vide benefi ts of up to an additional 52 weeks to provide adequate ben-
efi ts during periods of high unemployment. The maximum available 
duration should vary, depending on the severity of unemployment in 
a state. Under the current formula for a state to be EB eligible, there is 
both an IUR trigger level and a duration stipulation requiring unem-
ployment to be at least 120 percent of the level 12 months earlier, with 
an optional TUR trigger that has not been adopted by many states. 
Future state triggers should be based on a state’s TUR because the 
IUR triggers have proven ineff ective. Under the 2009 ARRA, states 
had the option to switch from an IUR to a TUR trigger. We propose 
a simple TUR trigger with the following schedule of EB durations:
• 7 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 6.5 percent, 
• 13 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 7 percent,
• 26 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 8 percent,
• 39 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 9 percent, and
• 52 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 10 percent .
States that have objected to a TUR trigger in the past when they 
have paid part of EB costs should have no objections to such a trigger 
mechanism once the costs are fully federally fi nanced.
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Naturally, the creation of an improved EB program would not 
inhibit the right of Congress and the President to provide emergency 
extended unemployment compensation in times of severe labor mar-
ket surplus. However, in times of normal labor markets, 26 weeks 
of regular UI benefi ts, when accompanied by vigorous provision of 
ES reemployment services, will accommodate successful job search 
by the majority of UI benefi ciaries. In times of high unemployment, 
the EB program will support extended job search, with the length 
of support increasing with the severity of labor market conditions. 
Finally, when economic conditions are extremely severe and wide-
spread, Congress and the President may act on an emergency basis to 
supplement the regular and EB programs. This approach would pro-
vide more timely provision of adequate durations of UI benefi ts when 
recessions occur, since the current system depends on Congressional 
action that often lags behind the deterioration of economic conditions. 
BENEFIT FINANCING
Most economic research on UI fi nancing has concerned the eff ect 
of experience-rated UI tax rates on employment stability. Woodbury 
(2014) summarized research results that suggest experience rating 
encourages employment stability when tax rates are responsive to 
benefi t charges. However, the evidence indicates that employers at 
tax rate maximums are not induced to avoid layoff s and instead have 
their benefi t costs subsidized by employers with stable employment. 
Experience rating in setting UI tax rates is a feature unique to the 
American UI system; it was essential in establishing the system and 
is unlikely to be eliminated, but it can be improved. A more pressing 
issue in UI fi nance is the failure of the system to adequately forward 
fund benefi t reserves in anticipation of recessions. This failure has 
compromised the fundamental mission of the system to provide ade-
quate income replacement to the involuntarily unemployed.
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The original intent of the UI fi nancing provisions in the Social 
Security Act and FUTA was that state UI programs should be self-
fi nancing in good times and bad. States were to forward fund ben-
efi ts by generating positive net system revenues in times of economic 
expansion to provide suffi  cient reserves for paying benefi ts in years 
of high unemployment. Forward funding is countercyclical, while 
the alternative of raising taxes to pay for benefi ts in the depth of a 
recession is pro-cyclical, driving the economy into a lower level of 
economic activity. 
Each state was expected to have a range of tax schedules from 
which they could select each year, depending on the reserve balance 
in the state unemployment trust fund account. A higher tax sched-
ule would be selected in years when system reserves were low rela-
tive to expected future needs. By experience rating, the tax rates in 
each schedule were to vary directly with each employer’s UI benefi t 
charge experience—usually measured by either a reserve history ratio 
to payrolls or a benefi t charge ratio to payrolls. The UI taxable wage 
bases (TWBs) in states and for the FUTA were to be suffi  cient to raise 
adequate resources for the states and federal UI accounts. Many of 
these expectations are currently not being met by existing state UI 
tax systems because of policy decisions at both the state and federal 
levels that aff ect both the TWB and the structure and application of 
tax rate schedule alternatives. 
Reserves generated by the FUTA tax are kept in federal Unem-
ployment Trust Fund (UTF) accounts at the U.S. Treasury to pay 
for state and federal UI program administration, loans to states that 
become insolvent paying regular benefi ts, extended benefi ts, and 
employment services through the Wagner-Peyser program. The FUTA 
tax rate is applied to the federal UI TWB to fund the federal unem-
ployment accounts. The FUTA tax base is also the minimum TWB 
that states can set to pay for regular state UI benefi ts. The UI TWB 
was originally set at the same level as that for the Social Security 
TWB for public pensions. The Social Security TWB became indexed 
in 1972 and has increased steadily to $128,400 in 2018, or about 18 
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times the size of the FUTA TWB, which is not indexed and has only 
increased three times, with the last increase eff ective in 1983. At only 
$7,000, the FUTA TWB is less than half the annualized federal mini-
mum wage, essentially making it a fl at tax per employee. It is inad-
equate to generate suffi  cient revenues for federal and state use. States 
can set their TWB at any level at or above $7,000. Most states keep 
their tax bases relatively low—more than half have TWBs of less than 
double the FUTA level. Those with tax bases of more than double the 
FUTA level are much more likely to avoid debt problems in periods 
of high unemployment (Vroman 2016).
Low TWBs also might depress hiring in the low wage labor 
markets. In many states, employers face the same UI tax bill for one 
worker paid $10,000 in a year and another paid $90,000 in that same 
year. Whereas the latter might provide a living wage, the former 
worker might be a multiple job holder earning $10,000 at each of two 
jobs. Each employer pays UI taxes on the full TWB every year, and 
that amount is paid multiple times on behalf of multiple job holders.12 
This discourages adding low-wage workers against the alternative of 
expanding hours for higher wage workers.
Having adequate levels of UI reserves to weather recessions 
depends upon raising enough revenue over the business cycle. States 
have multiple tax schedules, and state laws usually specify movement 
to a higher tax schedule that raises more revenue when state reserve 
balances are low. However, state legislatures often override their UI 
statutes and do not allow higher schedules to go into eff ect because 
of employer resistance to higher UI taxes. In addition, some states 
have tax schedules with an insuffi  cient range in rates to suffi  ciently 
translate employer unemployment experience into tax rates that ade-
quately distinguish experience. There are no federal requirements on 
the range of rates other than the residual statutory FUTA range from 
0.0 to 5.4 percent. Since the FUTA maximum is 6.0 percent with a 90 
percent reduction to employers in states with conforming UI systems, 
the FUTA tax is 0.6 percent and the lowest allowable state maximum 
rate is the diff erence, or 5.4 percent applied to a state tax base of 
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at least $7,000. Furthermore, some states have a small number of 
tax rates in their schedules and often include a zero rate, with many 
employers assigned the zero rate. The most extreme case is for states 
to have only two rates—a zero rate and a 5.4 percent rate, with large 
numbers of employers assessed the zero rate. In practice, such a sys-
tem is not truly experience-rated because the tax rate is unresponsive 
to benefi t charges over large ranges.
To achieve adequate forward funding, the Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation found that state accounts in the federal 
UTF should maintain balances “suffi  cient to pay at least one year of 
unemployment insurance benefi ts at levels comparable to its previous 
high cost” (ACUC 1996, p. 11). In 2010, this rule was established as 
a federal requirement for interest-free loans from the loan account 
in FUTA. The rule requires states to hold one year of reserves in the 
UTF based on the average of the three highest-cost rates experienced 
in the prior 20 years. This rate is known as the average high-cost rate 
(AHCR). The rule becomes fully eff ective in 2019; in 2014, it started 
to be phased in at a target rate of 50 percent of the AHCR, and it 
increases 10 percentage points each year until it will reach the AHCR 
in 2019.13
Recommendations
• State UI tax rate schedules should be suffi  cient to provide 
forward funding of reserves so that ongoing benefi t charges 
can be paid while building reserves for future periods of high 
unemployment. Regular UI benefi ts must be fi nanced by a tax 
system with rates that vary directly with an employer’s layoff  
experience. The degree of experience rating must be more than 
nominal, such that each tax schedule has a substantial number 
of rates—we recommend at least 10 rates in each schedule that 
vary from the maximum to the minimum by uniform amounts. 
The minimum should be a small positive value to maintain 
employer involvement in the system (such as 0.1 percent). 
Avoiding a zero minimum will help maintain a broad tax base 
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for funding UI benefi t payments. The maximum can remain at 
5.4 percent, provided that the TWB levels are suffi  cient.
• As average weekly earnings or average annual wages (AAW) 
increase over time, UI benefi ts and taxes should increase in 
tandem to maintain long-term balance between system infl ows 
and outfl ows. A key to fi nancing is the defi nition of the TWB. 
With the weekly benefi t amount (WBA) and maximum WBA 
defi nitions based on average wages in UI-covered employ-
ment, the TWB must be linked to the AAW in UI-covered 
employment to create a balanced system. A formula that has 
proven reliable is for the TWB to be two-thirds of the AAW in 
the prior year.14 Vroman (2016) reports that 19 states currently 
index the TWB, and he fi nds that an indexed TWB is essential 
for balance in fi nancing if the maximum WBA is also indexed 
to the AAW. 
• An adequate FUTA TWB should be set at 26 times the nation-
al AWW in UI-covered employment. Alternatively, the TWB 
could be pegged at 33 percent of the Social Security TWB. 
This would index the UI wage base to change in step with the 
Social Security base and ensure that FUTA revenues increase 
in step with aggregate earnings, while setting the UI TWB at a 
modest but adequate level.
 A TWB that is too low sets up a tax that is essentially a fl at per-
capita amount that creates all the inequities associated with a 
regressive tax system. The current excessively low TWB (the 
fi rst $7,000 of each worker’s annual earnings) falls more heav-
ily on employers of low wage workers for whom the UI tax is 
often a signifi cantly larger proportion of the wage bill. FUTA 
revenues must be suffi  cient to support UI administration, the 
permanent EB program, necessary loans to states, and admin-
istration of a well-staff ed and eff ective ES to enforce the work 
test and promote reemployment of UI benefi ciaries and other 
ES-registered job seekers. 
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• Financial incentives should be created to encourage forward 
funding of benefi ts. This goal can be encouraged by paying 
graduated interest rates on trust fund balances. That is, higher 
rates of interest would be paid to state accounts with higher 
reserve balances. At the same time, the rates of interest charges 
to states that must borrow to pay benefi ts should be closer to 
the private sector alternatives many states have used recently. 
Under no circumstances should the federal interest charges 
exceed market rates for short-term U.S. Treasury debt.
• To address the exemption of government and nonprofi t 
employers from FUTA taxation, a 3 percent premium should 
be assessed on reimbursements of benefi t charges to state and 
local government employers and nonprofi t fi rms that choose to 
operate as reimbursing employers. This FUTA payment would 
contribute to fi nancing UI administrative costs and ES reem-
ployment services available to job seekers formerly employed 
by those employers.
• Maintaining a UI system that pays adequate benefi ts to expe-
rienced workers who become unemployed through no fault of 
their own has met resistance both at the state and federal levels 
from employers who directly pay the full cost of UI taxes. 
This resistance is not likely to fade in the future.  However, 
economic studies show that the UI tax burden also falls indi-
rectly on workers, and public fi nance studies have shown that 
employees directly pay a considerable amount for UI cover-
age (Anderson and Meyer 2006). 
We suggest that half or more of the UI payroll taxes to fi nance 
benefi ts be directly paid by employees. Workers paying tax contribu-
tions would be in a much stronger position to advocate for UI benefi ts 
with adequate amounts and durations. Employee contributions would 
improve benefi t fi nancing by broadening the tax base. Furthermore, 
benefi t recipiency would most likely be higher with employee UI 
taxes, as has been the experience in other countries (Card and Riddell 
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1993). Even a low tax rate for workers would increase tax revenues 
because average UI tax rates on employers are also low—less than 
two-thirds of one percent (USDOL 2016).
ADMINISTRATIVE FINANCING
The administration of the UI, ES, and other federal-state labor 
market programs is funded by the FUTA tax. Administrative fund-
ing is divided among three accounts: Employment Security Admin-
istrative Account (ESAA), Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Account (EUCA), and Federal Unemployment Account (FUA). 
ESSA funds UI and ES administrative costs and the cost of some 
labor market information programs. USDOL provides these funds to 
the states based on Congressional approval of a formula involving 
state employment and unemployment data. In recent years, the ESAA 
has received 80 percent of FUTA funds. Of the other accounts, EUCA 
normally pays for half of the costs of the permanent EB program. 
FUA is the loan account from which states can borrow if their state 
UI trust fund accounts are insuffi  cient to pay regular state UI benefi ts.
States have had severe problems in the administration of their UI, 
ES, and related labor market programs. Funding has been inadequate 
for UI computer systems automation and staffi  ng of ES service deliv-
ery, and this problem has become more severe over time. The balances 
in the accounts have been inadequate. Moreover, Congress has appro-
priated a declining percentage of the tax revenues that are deposited 
into the ESAA. These low appropriations from the federal unemploy-
ment accounts to the states have been a long-term phenomenon. 
At the beginning of the UI program, employer FUTA tax pay-
ments were recorded as general revenues of the U.S. government, and 
UI administrative expenses were paid for out of general revenues.15 
By the early 1950s, it was estimated that FUTA revenues exceeded 
appropriated UI administrative grants to states by between $500 mil-
lion and $1 billion annually. The Employment Security Administra-
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tive Financing Act of 1954 requires that any excess amount of FUTA 
revenues over UI administrative grants to states be deposited into the 
UTF in FUA to make loans to states when their reserves were insuf-
fi cient to pay UI benefi ts. This act, commonly known as the Reed 
Act, set a limit on the level of reserves in the loan account and pro-
vided that reserves above that ceiling level be distributed to states for 
payment of regular benefi ts, program administration, or ES delivery. 
Motivated by the desire to control annual defi cits in the unifi ed fed-
eral budget, Congress raised the Reed Act ceiling from 0.33 percent 
of total payrolls in UI-covered employment in 1982 to 1.02 percent 
of covered payrolls today. Consequently, the incentive supplied by 
the Reed Act for Congress to adequately appropriate money from 
the UTF for UI administration has diminished. Increased revenues 
from the FUTA tax and new rules for Congressional appropriation of 
funds to the states could improve UI administration and funding of ES 
reemployment services. 
Recommendations
Although payment of UI benefi ts is an entitlement and does not 
require appropriations from Congress, payment of administrative 
funds to the state agencies for UI and Wagner-Peyser Act programs 
is discretionary and must be appropriated. UI administrative funding 
includes a formula for additional (contingency) funding when unem-
ployment increases above anticipated levels, but the Wagner-Peyser 
Act program has been underfunded for decades, and reemployment 
services are no longer directly funded, including for mandated reem-
ployment services provided under the WPRS initiative. 
Unemployment Insurance administration 
Congress should annually appropriate adequate funds for UI 
administration from the ESAA in the UTF. Beyond funding for 
benefi t payment administration and tax collection, separate fund-
ing should be appropriated for integrity eff orts, including benefi t 
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payment control and reemployment services and eligibility assess-
ments. Although benefi t payment control can pay for itself by collect-
ing overpayments, the formal eligibility review and reemployment 
process—recently renamed Reemployment Services and Eligibility 
Assessments (RESEA)—can also pay for itself by helping to reduce 
the duration of UI compensated unemployment.
It is important that administrative funding be suffi  cient to sup-
port the UI administrative process, especially during periods of high 
unemployment. Consideration should be given to making UI admin-
istration funding an entitlement, so that it can rise and fall to support 
the UI program in periods of high and low unemployment. An auto-
matic funding formula could be developed and distributed based on 
each state’s share of FUTA contributions.
Employment Service administration 
FUTA/ESAA should fully pay for the following Wagner-Peyser 
Act functions: 1) UI work test enforcement, 2) provision of labor 
exchange services to all ES applicants, and 3) provision of reemploy-
ment services for permanently separated UI claimants. Each of these 
functions is statutorily assigned to ES by the Wagner-Peyser Act. In 
addition, these functions have been evaluated and found to be cost 
eff ective (Jacobson et al. 2004).
Wagner-Peyser Act program funding under ESAA should be 
restored to a more robust level (e.g., the 1984 level in real terms) and 
then indexed to grow at the rate of the Social Security TWB (O’Leary 
and Eberts 2009).
Alternatively, given that the UI work test and the provision of 
reemployment services require mediated/in-person services, ESAA 
should provide funding for an adequate number of Wagner-Peyser 
positions, and then index funding to the Social Security TWB.
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EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES
Background
In its early history, the UI program focused heavily on temporary, 
cyclical unemployment. It mainly paid unemployment benefi ts until 
demand for workers picked up in the fi rms for which they had previ-
ously worked, and they were called back to their prior jobs. However, 
during the 1970s the incidence of permanent worker layoff s greatly 
increased, and that trend has continued and expanded. Permanent 
layoff s spread from blue collar jobs to white collar jobs and became 
a larger share of total unemployment. Temporary layoff  rates have 
declined and become less sensitive to the business cycle (Groshen 
and Potter 2003). During the Great Recession, permanent layoff s 
reached an all-time high at more than 55 percent of the unemployed 
(O’Leary 2010). Current Population Survey data reveal an upward 
trend in unemployment duration, with more workers unemployed for 
27 weeks or longer. The UI program burden increased as compen-
sated durations and exhaustion rates increased, and UI benefi ciaries 
correspondingly needed increased assistance in fi nding new jobs. 
USDOL responded to the growing worker dislocation problem 
by conducting demonstration projects in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 
1990s to test methods of assisting dislocated workers to return to work. 
Federal UI legislation responded to the growing worker dislocation 
problem in the early 1990s. Permanent work-sharing legislation was 
enacted in 1992, permitting states to establish work-sharing programs 
as part of their state UI laws. In 1993, similar permissive legislation 
was enacted allowing states to pay self-employment allowances in 
lieu of UI benefi ts for workers who work full time to establish a small 
business (Wandner 2010).
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Worker Profi ling and Reemployment Services 
Most signifi cantly, WPRS was enacted in 1993, requiring that all 
states establish early job search assistance referral programs for UI 
benefi ciaries most likely to exhaust benefi ts as part of their state UI 
programs. States developed methods to target services to dislocated 
workers using WPRS models. They then began referring selected UI 
claimants to employment services that often included orientation to 
the job seeker resource room, job referral, assessment and counsel-
ing, job search workshops, and occasionally referral to job training 
or Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) programs. The WPRS system 
represents the formal recognition of the adverse eff ect of worker dis-
location on UI claimants and the need to supplement referrals to jobs 
with a major initiative to train workers to search for their own jobs.
The UI, ES, and the public job training system adapted to these 
1990s employment and reemployment provisions in federal and 
state UI laws.16 At the national level, the Employment and Training 
Administration of USDOL provided extensive guidance to states 
about WPRS, developing a systems approach for state UI, ES, and 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA; now called the Workforce Innova-
tion and Opportunities Act [WIOA]) programs to work together to 
provide reemployment and training services. The national UI pro-
gram has provided model state legislation and continuing technical 
assistance regarding WPRS methods (Wandner 2010). Ongoing tech-
nical assistance and guidance was provided throughout the 1990s and 
has been renewed recently as part of the RESEA initiative. The ES 
and WIA provided early guidance for these innovations, but funding 
was not stable or suffi  cient to support increased reemployment rates.
Work sharing 
The national UI program provided model state legislation and 
guidance for the 1982 temporary work-sharing program, but not for 
the 1992 permanent work-sharing program because of concerns about 
possible technical fl aws in that legislation. A new round of technical 
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assistance followed clarifi cation of the rules and incentives for work 
sharing in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012. 
In a boost to labor demand similar to that of work sharing, model 
legislation and guidance were provided to states in 1994 to support 
establishment of state SEA programs (Wandner 2010).
UI, ES, and reemployment services
In the mid-1990s, the UI program updated its mission and func-
tion statement to take responsibility for supporting workers’ eff orts 
to return to work, as well as for properly paying UI benefi ts and col-
lecting UI taxes. Similarly, the national ES program responded to 
the WPRS system’s referral of UI claimants to Wagner-Peyser Act 
programs for the provision of reemployment services. Starting in the 
mid-1990s, state ES programs provided a substantial increase in the 
number of “reportable services” to UI recipients, assisting them to 
search for and fi nd work (Wandner 2010).
As a result, both the UI and ES programs have become respon-
sible for helping workers return to work, and both programs should 
continue to speed the return to work and raise reemployment rates. 
The WIA/WIOA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs participate 
in WPRS by receiving about one-third of their training referrals from 
workers receiving reemployment services in the WPRS system. Since 
UI claims taking has increasingly occurred outside the One-Stop 
career centers, state UI programs have little ability to directly provide 
UI eligibility reviews or referral to job openings or reemployment 
services. In response, ES has been providing most of these services. 
Research and Recommendations
Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA) 
Research. Since the 1970s, many studies have shown the eff ec-
tiveness of UI eligibility reviews, including the Charleston Claimant 
Placement and Work Experiment, the Washington State Alternative 
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Work Experiment, and the Maryland UI Work Search Demonstration 
(Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985; Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 
1994; Klepinger et al. 1998). The Charleston Experiment also found 
that providing reemployment services as well as eligibility reviews 
can further shorten durations of UI compensated unemployment. 
The original UI eligibility review program (ERP) of the 1970s 
was allowed to wither until the early 2000s with the establishment of 
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessments (REAs). The REA initia-
tive combines one-on-one in-person UI eligibility reviews, labor mar-
ket information, and referral to reemployment services. A series of 
REA evaluations in four states found evidence that the REA programs 
were eff ective in reducing UI duration and generating savings for the 
UI Trust Fund (Benus et al. 2008; Poe-Yamagata et al. 2011). Because 
the Nevada program generated substantially larger impacts than the 
other study states’ programs, the Nevada REA program study was 
extended to confi rm those fi ndings. The results confi rmed the ear-
lier results—the Nevada REA program was very eff ective in assisting 
claimants to exit the UI program sooner than they would have in the 
absence of the program (Michaelides et al. 2012). Based on these 
results, the study concluded that the combination of REA and reem-
ployment services is a highly eff ective model for reducing UI dura-
tion and assisting UI claimants to return to productive employment. 
In 2015, USDOL changed the name of the REA program to 
RESEA to make clear that reemployment services were expected 
to be provided as well as UI eligibility reviews. Based on positive 
results from the Nevada evaluation of REA, the Obama administra-
tion proposed signifi cant increases in program funding as part of its 
FY 2017 budget request. An additional increase in RESEA funding 
was placed in the President’s FY 2018 budget proposal (White House 
2017). However, the proposed increase was at the expense of ES 
funding, which is a counterproductive plan because RESEA requires 
adequate ES staffi  ng to be eff ective.
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Recommendations. REAs should be established and monitored 
in all states. The eligibility review process is an essential compo-
nent of the UI work test process, so it is critical to assure that the UI 
program operates as an insurance program, reducing concern about 
moral hazard that can occur in the absence of incentives to encourage 
UI claimants to actively search for work. ERPs also speed the return 
to work.
Eligibility reviews also should be conducted in conjunction with 
the provision of reemployment services for unemployed workers in 
need of these services. As a result, ERPs should be fully funded so 
they can be provided in person whenever possible, rather than through 
a voice response or computer claims process.
The RESEA program emphasizes the equal importance of reem-
ployment services and eligibility assessments. Funding for RESEA, 
however, was to be through the UI program. The provision of reem-
ployment services has been done by ES, and funding should be pro-
vided directly to ES for the WPRS initiative, which remains a part of 
federal law.
Worker Profi ling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) 
Research. While there have been a number of studies of the ef-
fectiveness of reemployment services since the 1970s, the WPRS 
initiative was enacted based on evaluation fi ndings regarding job 
search assistance treatment in the fi nal report of the New Jersey UI 
Reemployment Demonstration Project (Corson et al. 1989). The fi nd-
ings were strengthened by a fi ve-year follow-up study (Corson and 
Haimson 1996) that found positive second year eff ects from the job 
search assistance treatment. A Job Search Assistance Demonstration 
supported the New Jersey results (Decker et al. 2000), and random 
trials in Kentucky provided further evidence in support of targeting 
attention to those most likely to exhaust their UI entitlements (Black 
et al. 2003). Early implementation of WPRS was rigorously evaluated 
(Dickinson et al. 1999).
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Recommendations. WPRS should be fully funded through 
FUTA, including regular fi nancial support to states for updating 
WPRS statistical selection models. Specifi cally, suffi  cient funding 
should be provided to maintain timely systems for selection and re-
ferral of claimants most likely to exhaust UI, and have ES conduct 
in-person/mediated reemployment services to at least a substantial 
percentage of workers who would benefi t from these services. 
Under the WPRS system, nearly all UI benefi ciaries without a 
defi nite employer recall date are profi led, and 10 to 15 percent of 
these workers are referred to services. This referral rate appears to 
reasonably refl ect the capacity of the workforce system to provide 
reemployment services. However, the reemployment services cur-
rently provided to participants are limited in quantity and quality. 
WPRS funding should be increased by about $300 million per year, 
which should be provided through Wagner-Peyser Act ES programs 
(Wandner 2010).
In addition, ES is underfunded throughout the country. Its fund-
ing level has remained almost constant in nominal terms, but declined 
dramatically in real terms, over the past 25 years. For example, Min-
nesota received $14 million per year in Wagner-Peyser grants in 1984 
and employed 485 workers. In 2017, its annual grant was still $14 
million, but that amount only funded 120 workers. The overall fund-
ing for ES should be increased to about $1.5 billion per year to restore 
its funding in real terms to its early 1980s levels.17 Without improved 
funding, the states will continue to reduce mediated/in-person ser-
vices and replace them with automated services (Wandner 2013a).
The above recommendations are consistent with a 1999 report by 
a WPRS work group composed of national, regional, and state experts 
that reviewed the system based on early operational experience. The 
work group made seven recommendations to improve the WPRS 
system, including that state agencies should provide more extensive 
reemployment services to participating UI claimants and that USDOL 
should separately fund these reemployment services (Wandner and 
Messenger 1999).
Chapter 5.indd   164 9/5/2018   9:07:22 AM
Unemployment Insurance Reform   165
Work sharing/short-time compensation 
Research. California enacted the fi rst work-sharing program in 
the United States. The federal government enacted temporary work-
sharing legislation in 1982 and then permanent legislation in 1992 
and 2012. As a result, California conducted an early evaluation of its 
program (Employment Development Department 1982), and USDOL 
followed, conducting two national evaluations of the work-sharing 
program, one in the 1980s and another in the 1990s (Kerachsky et al. 
1986; Walsh et al. 1997). Other industrialized countries have evalu-
ated their work-sharing programs, analyzing program operation as 
well as eff ectiveness and effi  ciency. For example, Canada has con-
ducted several evaluations (Ekos Research Associates 1993; HRSDC 
2005), as has Germany (Crimmann, Wiessner, and Bell 2010) and 
other European countries (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). Although 
none of these studies has been as rigorous as the experimental evalu-
ations of other reemployment services, a consensus has developed 
among researchers and policy analysts that work sharing helps pre-
vent unemployment and does so at a modest cost, because in the 
absence of the program, an equivalent expenditure would be made to 
pay UI benefi ts to workers who become totally unemployed.
The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 
(MCTRJCA) was enacted into law on February 22, 2012. The act’s 
work-sharing subtitle D describes the Short-Time Compensation 
(STC) program and required the Secretary of Labor to report to Con-
gress and the president on the implementation of the STC provisions 
by February 2016. It expanded and clarifi ed the defi nition of STC, 
and that defi nition has been adopted by all states with a conforming 
STC program. MCTRJCA provided the Secretary of Labor with suffi  -
cient fl exibility to guide states through the interpretation of their laws 
and assist them in bringing their state laws into conformity with the 
new federal defi nition. 
To implement the provisions of the act, USDOL initiated two 
work-sharing studies, a survey of employers and a study of the imple-
mentation of the 2012 act. The employer survey was conducted in 
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four states for both participating and nonparticipating employers: 
Kansas, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Washington (Balducchi et al. 
2015). The survey fi ndings include:
• Work-sharing employers overwhelmingly were very satisfi ed 
with their state’s program, with many employers believing 
it was instrumental in allowing them to retain highly skilled 
workers. 
• Awareness of the work-sharing program is limited.
• Usage was greatest among manufacturing employers, larger 
employers, employers who had been in business for longer 
periods than nonparticipating employers, and employers with 
more skilled workers.
• From 43 to 65 percent of the work-sharing employers were 
repeat users.
• From 16 to 21 percent of the work-sharing employers eventu-
ally laid off  some participating employees because of lack of 
work.
• From 60 to 70 percent of participating employers found that 
work sharing imposed an increased administrative burden 
compared to the regular UI program. The burden was pri-
marily associated with the continued claim process, because 
the great majority of employers found it easy to apply for the 
program.
The second MCTRJCA study (Bennicci and Wandner 2015) 
reported that states found enacting conforming work-sharing legis-
lation to be easy because most of the changes were minor. In addi-
tion, USDOL facilitated the process by reviewing each state’s law and 
communicated directly with the states about the necessary changes 
to their state laws to achieve conformity. For states enacting legisla-
tion to implement a new or revised work-sharing program, USDOL 
provided model legislation and guidance, including reviewing drafts 
of legislation. In enacting new STC legislation, most study states 
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faced little public opposition to the legislation, although the eff ort 
to achieve enactment was lengthy and contentious in some states. 
For study states with existing STC laws, implementing changes to 
their programs for conformity to the MCTRJCA was not a signifi cant 
challenge. The changes were primarily focused on revisions to the 
STC application, state STC policies and procedures, and educating 
employers about the changes. One major administrative challenge for 
state agencies was getting ready to scale up the program during the 
next recession. A few states were better prepared than others because 
they had automated systems for applications and claims fi ling. 
In February 2016, Secretary of Labor Perez transmitted a report 
to Congress based on the fi ndings of Bennicci and Wandner (2015) 
and Balducchi et al. (2015). USDOL also supported a fi eld experi-
ment to evaluate ways to inform employers about the availability of 
the work-sharing program as an alternative to layoff s. 
Recommendations. A number of changes to the work-sharing 
program should be considered:
• Work sharing should be extended to all states, and program 
use should be expanded within states during recession peri-
ods. USDOL should encourage states to adopt work-sharing 
legislation and make use of the program. 
• States enacting new work-sharing legislation should be pro-
vided with funding to implement and initially market the 
program. 
• USDOL should increase administrative funding for work-
sharing program administration because the program requires 
more staff  time than the regular UI program. 
• Congress should consider legislation to relieve employers 
from paying for the costs of work sharing, instead paying for 
the program from FUTA or federal general revenue—not state 
trust fund accounts. Congress should also consider having 
STC benefi ts not reduce participants’ future potential duration 
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for regular UI benefi ts. These reforms would greatly encour-
age employers, workers, and states to participate in the STC 
program.
 Self-Employment Assistance (SEA)
Research. SEA is a small but eff ective program in several states. 
It has been actively used in Maine, New Jersey, New York, and 
Oregon. SEA is also a statutory option in Delaware, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania. Although similar programs serve considerably more 
workers in other major industrial nations, it is not clear that the SEA 
in its present form will expand to other states in the United States. 
The program is not likely to be adopted by other states unless suffi  -
cient funding for entrepreneurial counseling and training is provided 
to unemployed workers participating in the program. States with SEA 
programs frequently have no steady source of funding for training in 
the basic management, accounting, and marketing skills needed to 
run a successful business.
Before enacting a federal SEA statute, USDOL conducted two 
self-employment allowance experiments in Washington and Massa-
chusetts (Benus et al. 1995). The Washington experiment involved 
a one-time lump-sum payment, while the Massachusetts experiment 
involved weekly payments like regular UI. The Massachusetts dem-
onstration project was found to be cost eff ective, whereas the Wash-
ington program was not. The Massachusetts experiment estimated 
that the program reduced participants’ spells of unemployment and 
increased their total time in employment. Participation also had a pos-
itive impact on participants’ earnings. When placed in a benefi t-cost 
framework, the Massachusetts experiment provided net benefi ts to 
participants, society, and the government sector. This meant that the 
cost of the program was exceeded by the benefi ts to the government, 
especially in the form of increased tax payments, since participants 
were found to earn a great deal more than nonparticipants. 
The Massachusetts experimental program with weekly payments 
was chosen as the design for the federal SEA program. On the basis 
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of an interim evaluation report (Benus et al. 1991), Congress enacted 
a temporary program in late 1993 with a fi ve-year sunset provision 
as part of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). The fi nal 
evaluation (Benus et al. 1995) provided strong fi ndings of cost eff ec-
tiveness and was the basis for making the federal SEA program per-
manent in 1998. 
Because of dissatisfaction with the small size of the SEA pro-
gram, proposals were developed to make administrative and legis-
lative changes to it, including the provision of administrative funds 
and federal technical assistance. Under the MCTRJCA, new SEA 
provisions were adopted to encourage state adoption and expansion 
of SEA. However, no new states adopted the program, even though 
USDOL provided guidance and model legislation to the state work-
force agencies in 2012 (Employment and Training Administration 
2012). Even states that were interested in adopting the SEA program 
did not do so because they were overburdened with operating their 
own UI programs during a period of continued high unemployment 
after the Great Recession.
Although the SEA program has been open to adoption to all states 
since it was included as a displaced worker alternative in NAFTA, 
few states have chosen to establish and use SEA programs. Even in 
the seven states with SEA programs, participation is limited because 
only a small percentage of the UI claimants want to set up their own 
businesses. Moreover, few of the workers who are ready to participate 
are actually given a chance, largely because of diffi  culty in securing 
funds for entrepreneurial training. Participation was low before the 
Great Recession, and program use increased somewhat after its onset 
in Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. 
Recommendations. SEA should be made available to unem-
ployed workers in all states. The program should become a part of all 
state UI laws. Eligibility for SEA should continue to be limited to UI 
claimants who are permanently separated from their jobs and have a 
high probability of exhausting their UI benefi ts as indicated by their 
WPRS profi ling score.
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The principal impediment to off ering SEA participation in states 
with SEA programs has been a lack of funding for entrepreneurial 
training that prepares unemployed workers to establish their own 
businesses. The state SEA programs should partner with state WIOA 
and Small Business Development Centers to have them fund and/or 
provide such entrepreneurial training. The federal government also 
should encourage and fund these partnering arrangements.
Reemployment bonuses 
Research. Between 1984 and 1989, four reemployment bonus 
experiments were conducted in the states of Illinois, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington. All four experiments involved pro-
viding lump-sum payments to permanently separated workers who 
took new, full-time jobs within 6 to 12 weeks after becoming unem-
ployed and held those jobs for at least three to four months. These 
experiments were conducted to fi nd a strategy to overcome the work 
disincentive eff ect of cash UI payments to unemployed workers. The 
reemployment bonus design was intended to speed the return to work 
of dislocated workers in a way that would benefi t employees and be 
cost eff ective. The concept behind these experiments was that UI 
claimants would be better off  if they went back to work sooner and 
took jobs similar to the jobs they would have taken in the absence of 
their bonus off ers. Bonus off ers were tested to see if they would be 
cost eff ective to the government sector, that is, if the cost of off er-
ing bonuses was off set by a decrease in UI payments to unemployed 
workers and an increase in tax receipts during their longer period of 
employment. 
An analysis simulating profi ling reemployment bonuses was 
conducted with data from the Pennsylvania and Washington state 
experiments, the two experiments that appeared to have the greatest 
policy relevance (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 2005). This analysis 
was conducted for two reasons. First, reemployment bonuses seemed 
to be policy appropriate only for permanently separated dislocated 
workers, a conclusion that had already been recognized by a 1994 
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Clinton administration proposal to implement targeted reemployment 
bonuses.18 Second, the Pennsylvania and Washington state results 
were rather small across the 10 treatments tested, with fi ve of the 
treatments in those two states found to be cost eff ective to society and 
to the government sector, but only two treatments were cost eff ec-
tive for the UI system (Corson et al. 1992; O’Leary, Spiegelman, and 
Kline 1995). In the absence of profi ling, no optimum reemployment 
bonus design emerged from the experimental results.
Analysis of the profi led reemployment bonus data suggested 
that profi ling improved the cost eff ectiveness from the perspective 
of the UI program. In all treatments in both states, impact estimates 
with profi ling generally were stronger than those without it. Off ering 
bonuses to the top 50 percent of the profi led distribution—that is, the 
half identifi ed as most likely to exhaust UI benefi ts—was more cost 
eff ective than setting the threshold at either 25 percent or 75 percent. 
The results comparing bonus amounts (high and low in Pennsylvania 
and high, medium, and low in Washington) and eligibility periods 
(short and long in both states) suggested that a low bonus amount 
combined with a long eligibility period was most cost eff ective. These 
estimates “suggest that such a targeted bonus off er would yield appre-
ciable net benefi ts to the UI trust funds if implemented as a perma-
nent program” (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 2005, p. 279). Their 
recommendation was for a bonus amount of about three times the 
weekly benefi t and a qualifi cation period of about 12 weeks off ered to 
the 50 percent of profi led UI benefi ciaries most likely to exhaust their 
UI entitlements. Using the national average weekly benefi t amount 
for the 12 months ending in February 2018, the bonus would aver-
age $1,057. Even though the reemployment bonus experiments were 
completed in the early 1990s, reemployment bonuses have not yet 
been implemented as part of U.S. labor market policy. 
Recommendations. Reemployment bonuses speed the return to 
work of dislocated workers by increasing their work search eff orts. 
Bonuses do not have an adverse economic eff ect on workers because, 
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as research shows, workers do not take jobs that pay less than those 
that they would have taken (later) in the absence of a reemployment 
bonus off er. Reemployment bonuses tend to be cost eff ective if they 
are off ered to dislocated workers with a high probability of exhaust-
ing their UI benefi t entitlements as measured by their WPRS profi l-
ing score. Reemployment bonuses should be enacted into federal law 
using the language of the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994. The 
result would be a permissive program that states could adopt, off ering 
modest reemployment bonuses to targeted UI benefi ciaries who have 
been permanently separated from their prior jobs.
Education and training 
The UI program has declined in its ability to provide benefi ts 
to experienced, covered workers who become unemployed through 
no fault of their own. Declining benefi t adequacy has resulted from 
insuffi  cient forward funding of the system. Nonetheless, there have 
been numerous proposals to fund education and training programs 
from state and federal UI funds. Despite prohibitions on the use of 
UI funds for anything other than the payment of UI benefi ts and the 
administration of UI and related programs, the substantial size of the 
program makes it a target for attempts to use UI funds for non-UI pur-
poses. Specifi cally, the existence of the large (but dedicated) UI Trust 
Fund makes the UI program a target for funding other programs. The 
public fi nance literature shows that dedicated trust funds frequently 
have been targets of budgetary raiders. 
Recommendations. The integrity of the UI system must be 
maintained. To that end, FUTA reserves should be limited to sup-
porting UI and ES administration and services. While FUTA fund-
ing should support the provision of more and better reemployment 
services, FUTA funds should continue to be limited to funding UI and 
ES administration. Specifi cally, education and training for the long-
term unemployed should not be funded from either FUTA reserves or 
state accounts in the UTF. Congress should consider funding training 
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from U.S. Department of Education grants and loans because WIOA 
grants to states are not adequate to provide even the amount of job 
training currently needed. 
CONCLUSION
The recommendations presented in this chapter are part of our 
attempt to develop a comprehensive UI reform proposal that would 
create a program that would be adequately funded and would help 
speed the return to work for all UI recipients.
In Appendix 5A, our recommendations are compared to three 
other sets of recommendations: the recommendations in the 2017 
budget request by President Obama (WHO); a proposal by the 
authors from the Center for Law and Social Policy, Georgetown 
University, and the National Employment Law Project (CGN); and 
recommendations from the 2018 budget request by President Trump 
(WHT). A detailed summary of the elements of the proposals is given 
in Appendix 5B. Our recommendations are the most comprehensive 
with respect to the reform of UI as a social insurance program across 
the full range of issues that relate to the UI program. By contrast, 
although the WHO proposals try to enhance the basic role of UI as a 
social insurance program, they are incomplete and would not create 
an adequate, balanced, and eff ective UI system. Similarly, the CGN is 
not comprehensive and fails to respect social insurance principles and 
fi nancing challenges. The WHT proposal is the most limited approach 
to UI reform of the three programs compared.
Comprehensive UI reform is urgently needed. The UI program is 
out of balance today, and it is not prepared or preparing for the next 
recession. Despite the urgent need for reform, it is diffi  cult to believe 
that comprehensive reform is likely to occur at the state or national 
level, given widespread employer opposition to expanding the unem-
ployment benefi t system and raising taxes to fund these benefi ts. 
We suggest that the most likely route to comprehensive UI reform 
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involves reducing or eliminating employer taxes by instead having 
employees directly fund much or all of the UI program.
Notes
We thank David Balducchi and Wayne Vroman for constructive comments on 
an earlier version of this chapter. 
 1. The three main separation reasons covered by the ARRA concern: 1) 
domestic violence, 2) illness or disability of an immediate family mem-
ber, and 3) moving to accompany a spouse who relocates to a distance 
impractical for commuting to the job.  
 2. Gary Burtless (1983) also described how the lower recipiency ratio 
weakened the countercyclical strength of the UI system to dampen eco-
nomic downturns.  
 3. The states are Florida, Iowa, Idaho, Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, and North Dakota. 
 4. There has been a sharp downward trend in the number of local offi  ces 
from nearly 3,600 in 2003 and 2004 to 2,451 in May 2018. (A tempo-
rary increase in the number of offi  ces occurred in 2009 and 2010 with 
funding from the ARRA.)  Most of the decline has occurred in the affi  li-
ate offi  ces, which has disproportionately aff ected ES (compared to the 
WIA) and reduced public workforce services in less densely populated 
parts of the United States. 
 5. Two states off er slightly longer potential durations; Massachusetts pro-
vides up to 30 weeks while Montana off ers up to 28 (USDOL 2016). 
 6. The states are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina. In Kansas, the potential duration 
is 26 weeks if state unemployment is 6 percent or higher, but 20 weeks 
when the unemployment rate averaged over the prior 3 months is below 
6 percent at the time of UI benefi t application. 
 7. In 2013, four UI programs (California, Connecticut, Ohio, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands) were still paying on loans from the U.S. Treasury, while 
six other states (Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, 
and Texas) were still repaying other loans or bond debts from UI benefi t 
payments (O’Leary and Kline 2016, p. 1). 
 8. Note, however, that applicants qualifying for the minimum weekly ben-
efi t amount usually receive higher than 50 percent wage replacement per 
week.  
 9. This discussion is drawn from O’Leary and Barnow (2016).  In January 
2018, California and the Virgin Islands were still repaying loans to the 
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Treasury, and Michigan, Nevada and Pennsylvania were still repaying 
other loans or bond debts (USDOL 2018). 
 10.  The rest of this section draws on Wandner (2012). 
 11.  Suggestions for federal benefi t standards are fully described below. 
 12. Despite having multiple employers make tax payments on their behalf, 
multiple job holders have diffi  culty accessing UI in many states when 
they lose one of their jobs because work search rules require availability 
for full-time work. As we assert above, eligibility rules should permit 
seeking part-time work if employment has customarily been part time.  
 13. This paragraph draws on O’Leary and Barnow (2016, pp. 21–22).  
 14. Among the 19 states with indexed TWBs, the average rate is 72 percent 
of the average annual wage in UI-covered employment.  
 15. This paragraph is drawn from O’Leary and Barnow (2016).  
 16. When WPRS started operations in 1994, job training was delivered 
under the Job Training Partnership Act (1982), which later was reor-
ganized as the Workforce Investment Act (1998), and now is the Work-
force Innovation and Opportunity Act (2014).  In areas where funding 
was suffi  cient, ES provided WPRS services; elsewhere the training part-
ners helped starting with JTPA.  The WIA program established one-stop 
centers where all services were available under one roof, and WIOA 
continued the one-stop model. 
 17. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 by Balducchi and 
O’Leary.  
  18. The proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 was never enacted into law. 
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Appendix 5A
Comparison of UI Reform Proposals
This Appendix considers UI system reforms that should be addressed 
before the next recession. Three comprehensive UI system reform proposals 
are reviewed. We start with our own (O’Leary and Wandner or OW), based 
on the principles and research reviewed in this chapter. We then describe 
the main elements of two other proposals from governmental and nongov-
ernmental sources: the Obama Administration FY 2017 Presidential Budget 
Request (White House-Obama or WHO) and a consortium led by the Center 
for American Progress and including Georgetown University and the National 
Employment Law Project (CGN).1 Table 5A.1 provides an overview of the 
areas where each of the groups proposes reforms. An expanded version of this 
summary is given in Appendix 5B, which includes details of each proposal. 
We also discuss a list of proposals for reforming four UI features made 
by the Trump administration.
COMPARATIVE SUMMARIES OF PROPOSALS
The three recent UI reform proposals diff er in many of their details, but 
they all propose reasonably comprehensive system-wide reform—with the 
WHO proposal being the least comprehensive of the three—while placing a 
diff erent emphasis on some issues, including the commitment to maintaining 
the social insurance character of the UI program and the use of federal stan-
dards versus fi nancial incentives for state action. In this section, the programs 
are compared with a focus on the topic areas listed in Table 5A.1.
O’Leary-Wandner (OW) Proposal 
The following is a summary of the UI reform proposals we believe 
should be set as federal conformity requirements for state UI programs. 
Initial eligibility: Requires states to have an alternate base period (ABP). 
Permits suitable work to be limited to part-time work if that was customary, 
and lets the minimum acceptable wage for suitable work decline with the 
duration of benefi t receipt. Sets a low minimum monetary eligibility require-
ment such as having one base period quarter with earnings of at least $1,000 
and a second base period quarter with at least $500.
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Table 5A.1  Comparison of Unemployment Insurance (UI) Reforms Proposed by O’Leary and Wandner (OW), the 
Obama White House (WHO), and the Center for American Progress/Georgetown University/National 
Employment Law Project (CGN) 
Proposals by UI feature OW WHO CGN
Initial eligibility (number of states) Dollars and HQ Dollars and HQ Weeks and HQ
Alternate base period (40) Yes Yes Yes
Seeking part-time work (26) Yes Yes Yes
Good cause quits–family (20) Yes Yes
Defi nition of suitable work Declining wage
Extended base period Yes
Continuing eligibility
Work search and employment services Yes RESEA
High quality reemployment services Yes
Benefi t standards 50%, max 2/3 AWW 50%, max 2/3 AWW 50%, max 2/3 AWW
Duration of regular benefi ts 26 earnings related 26 uniform 26 uniform
Partial UI benefi ts Yes
Retirement income off set Eliminate
Training allowance (13) Yes
Dependents allowance (6)
Disaster unemployment assistance Expand
Stipends in OJT and apprenticeships Add
Extended benefi ts—reform EB system TUR triggers fed-state TUR triggers fed-state TUR triggers fed-state
Emergency extended compensation Federal discretion
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Financing features
Minimum tax rates Yes Yes Yes
Number of rates Yes
Range of rates Yes
Taxable wage base (FUTA) reforms Yes Yes Yes
Forward funding standards Yes Yes Yes
Payroll tax year end rebates Yes Yes
Funding EB and EUC Yes Yes
Fund ES and UI administration Yes Yes
Special programs
Work sharing/STC All states All states All states
Self-employment assistance All states All states All states
Reemployment bonuses Proposed-targeted
Wage insurance Research Proposed Proposed
Relocation allowances Proposed
Supportive services Proposed
Direct job creation Proposed
Unemployment assistance Proposed
UI program policy research Proposed Proposed
NOTES: A more detailed comparison is given in Appendix 5B. OJT: on-the-job training; HQ: high-quarter earnings; AWW: average weekly 
wage; TUR: total unemployment rate; EB: Extended Benefi ts; FUTA: Federal Unemployment Tax Act; STC: Short-Time Compensation.
SOURCE: O’Leary and Wandner (this paper), the White House (2017), and West et al. (2016). 
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Continuing eligibility: Requires continuous active work search monitor-
ing and federally fund quality reemployment services for all UI benefi ciaries.
Benefi t standards: Sets a maximum potential duration of at least 26 
weeks, with actual duration increasing with base period earnings. Makes the 
wage replacement rate at least 50 percent of the maximum weekly benefi t 
amount (WBA), and sets the state maximum WBA at two-thirds of the state 
average weekly wage (AWW) in UI covered employment.
Extended benefi ts: Each state should have a schedule of benefi t dura-
tions for state extended benefi ts (EB) based on total unemployment rate (TUR) 
triggers, paid from federal funds. Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
(EUC) would be provided during high unemployment periods by the federal 
government at the discretion of Congress, paid from general revenue.
Financing features: The taxable wage base (TWB) should be equal to 
one-third of the Social Security base and be indexed to increase in proportion 
to the Social Security TWB. State tax schedules would not include a zero tax 
rate and must have at least 10 diff erent rates in each tax schedule, resulting 
in all employers supporting UI system costs. Both employers and employees 
should pay UI taxes, with employees paying at least half of the total tax con-
tributions to increase political support and assure full engagement with the UI 
program. Annual UI tax schedule waivers may not be granted; that is, states 
should adhere to the appropriate tax schedule under state law, without any 
legislative deferral for movement to higher schedules. States with insuffi  cient 
forward funding would be subject to loss of UI off set credits. The tax sched-
ule would be selected annually based on the adequacy of system reserves. 
USDOL would set required standards for reserve adequacy. 
Special programs: All states would have programs for work-sharing 
and self-employment assistance. USDOL would permit states to establish 
targeted reemployment bonus programs and sponsor several diff erent state 
random trials to evaluate wage insurance. 
Administrative fi nancing: Provides adequate federal funding for 
administration and Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment 
(RESEA). 
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White House Obama (WHO) Proposal: Diff erences from the OW Proposal
Initial eligibility: Requires all ARRA UI modernization features, includ-
ing family reasons for good-cause quit, does not specify base period earnings 
requirements, and recommends a high quarter earnings rule, but does not 
reduce the value of suitable wage with duration of unemployment. 
Continuing eligibility: Requires RESEA during EB receipt.
Benefi t standards: Sets a uniform potential duration of 26 weeks with 
the same wage replacement rate and same maximum weekly benefi t amount 
formula as OW. Calls for TUR triggers for state EB and off ers an EB program 
that makes use of a TUR schedule. EB is funded from EUCA or general 
federal revenues, and there is no mention of a discretionary EUC program.
Financing features: TWB is raised to $40,000 and indexed, and the 
FUTA tax rate is reduced to be revenue neutral. State tax schedules are not 
addressed. The forward funding criterion is a 0.5 Average High Cost Multiple 
(AHCM) subject to a reduction in UI off set credits. The tax schedule would 
be selected annually based on the adequacy of system reserves. USDOL 
should set required standards for reserve adequacy. 
Special programs: Requires that work sharing be available and pro-
vides wage insurance. 
Administrative fi nancing: Not addressed.
CGN: Diff erences from the OW Proposal
Initial eligibility: Permits compelling family reasons for good-cause 
quits. Specifi es base period earnings as 300 times state minimum hourly 
wage and requires hours worked in at least two calendar quarters. Recom-
mends a move toward hours-based eligibility. State UI agency notifi es poten-
tially eligible unemployed workers. Sets standards for automated monetary 
eligibility procedures. Does not reduce the value of suitable wage with dura-
tion of unemployment. 
Continuing eligibility: Requires providing RESEA to UI recipients dur-
ing EB receipt.
Benefi t standards: Requires a uniform potential duration of 26 weeks. 
Federal government pays 25 percent of the cost for benefi ts between 27 and 
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39 weeks. Calls for TUR triggers for state EB, similar to the OW EB-TUR 
schedule. EB is funded from FUTA or general federal revenues. Provides a 
26-week job stipend during classroom job training, on-the-job training, or 
apprenticeship. Does not mention discretionary EUC.
Financing features: TWB raised to one-half the Social Security TWB 
and then indexed. Require a minimum UI tax rate greater than zero for states. 
Standardize experience rating across states. Year-end rebates for multiple job 
holders.
Special programs: Requires that work sharing be available and pro-
vides wage insurance. 
Administrative fi nancing: Proposes adequate federal funding for 
administration and RESEA. 
MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROPOSALS
The U.S. labor market has changed dramatically since the inception of 
the UI program in 1935. Nonetheless, there has been no systematic updating 
of coverage and eligibility provisions at the state level. Some needed changes 
have been made by individual state initiatives and others were encouraged 
by the 2009 UI Modernization program. However, the weakness of UI Mod-
ernization is revealed by the fact that fi ve of the states that received incen-
tive payments for introducing elements of UI Modernization have already 
repealed the new features. The following contrasts the three main reform pro-
posals on the important policy areas. 
The OW proposals are based on the assertion that the current UI program 
is broken. The regular UI benefi t system and the benefi t fi nancing system 
does not support a self-sustaining program that pays adequate benefi ts for 
suffi  cient durations to support reemployment. Similarly, the aim of the WHO 
proposal is to introduce balance between the basic benefi t and fi nancing pro-
visions of the regular UI program, such that the regular program provides 
adequate UI benefi ts that are fully funded over the business cycle. The CGN 
program contains several elements in the OW and WHO proposals, but the 
CGN presses many dimensions of proposed UI reforms beyond social insur-
ance principles and toward social welfare aims. 
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Eligibility and Benefi ts
In contrast to WHO and CGN, the OW proposal recommends fewer 
changes to be mandated by federal law, with states free to choose among 
reform options. The OW proposed changes would: 
• require states to provide for an Alternative Benefi t Period,
• permit part-time workers to search for part-time work,
• remove retirement income off set, and
• permit states to reduce suitable reemployment wage rates as the dura-
tion of unemployment increases.
The WHO and CGN proposals require states to allow voluntary quits for 
compelling family reasons. CGN includes all the above plus some changes 
that would go beyond social insurance principles to add elements of social 
welfare to UI, with benefi ts based on means or household composition. For 
example, it proposes means-tested benefi ts for very long-term unemployed 
persons no longer eligible for regular UI. 
Extended Benefi ts
The OW proposal would introduce a schedule for EB potential durations 
tied to the state or federal TUR level and would require 100 percent federal 
fi nancing of EB. The WHO and CGN proposals are similar to those of OW, 
and all three require EB to be fully paid by the federal government from the 
UTF, with any necessary supplements from general revenues. 
All three EB proposals presume that states provide potential durations 
of at least 26 weeks of regular UI benefi ts regardless of the TUR level. The 
OW proposal also recognizes that Congress, in times of deep recessions, may 
exercise discretion to provide emergency EB to supplement state regular UI 
and EB programs. 
Benefi t Financing 
The OW proposal aims to restore the UI program as an automatic stabi-
lizer for the macro-economy––injecting spending during high unemployment 
and withdrawing tax contributions during economic recoveries. The fi nanc-
ing system is countercyclical if benefi ts are paid through a forward fund-
ing mechanism, that is, by having adequate state trust fund reserves at the 
beginning of recessions. Spending is injected immediately, but tax rates rise 
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only after experience-rating systems factor in increased benefi t charges. The 
OW proposal incentivizes forward funding of benefi ts by paying increasingly 
higher rates of interest on reserves as balances increase, and by increasing the 
credit off set penalties as negative balances increase. 
The main WHO incentive to accomplish forward funding is paying 
states higher interest rates when their trust fund accounts reach higher AHCM 
levels. This goes beyond the existing USDOL policy of off ering zero-interest 
short-term loans when AHCMs reach specifi ed levels. The WHO proposal 
would apply a FUTA credit reduction to states with an AHCM of less than 
0.5. A FUTA credit reduction is the way states currently pay back borrowed 
funds when they prefer not to adjust state tax rates or TWBs or to issue bonds. 
The CGN proposal requires states to achieve a 1.0 AHCM within 5 years 
and also requires USDOL to establish minimum rates below which states’ tax 
revenues cannot fall. The plan would pay diff erentially high interest rates to 
states with balances greater than the target AHCM.
The CGN and WHO proposals would probably achieve sound counter-
cyclical fi nancing. However, the outcome of the CGN’s setting of the AHCM 
target is uncertain because it depends on annual discretionary administrative 
action.
Reemployment
The OW proposals argue that a strong ES is necessary to implement 
the UI work test to ensure that UI recipients are able, available, and actively 
searching for work. ES needs to refer UI recipients to jobs and provide labor 
market information. Additionally, OW proposals cite evidence that job search 
assistance and other reemployment services (RES) have been shown to be 
highly cost eff ective in promoting return to work and shortening durations 
of UI benefi t receipt. Nonetheless, UI claimants currently receive inadequate 
reemployment services both because of general underfunding of ES and 
because of inadequate funding of UI reemployment services (Wandner 2015). 
The OW proposal is to fund both from FUTA. This could be accomplished by 
increasing and indexing the FUTA TWB. At a minimum, ES funding should 
be returned to the 1984 level in real terms.
WHO also recommends expansion of other complementary reemploy-
ment and unemployment prevention services, including STC, SEA, and tar-
geted reemployment bonuses. A new federal law would be required to make 
reemployment bonuses a legally permissible use of UTF reserves.
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WHO and CGN also recognize the need for enhanced ES and reem-
ployment services funding, but they deal with this issue in diff erent ways. 
The WHO proposal leaves this entire issue to a new UI Modernization pro-
gram with no additional federal funding, which would most likely result in 
inadequate implementation. WHO proposes a fi nancial incentive to states for 
adopting and implementing STC. It also proposes a new wage insurance pro-
gram outside the UI program and recommends a fi eld experiment to evalu-
ate the possible cost eff ectiveness and take-up rate under this type of pro-
gram. Wage insurance has been a little-used feature of the Alternative Trade 
Adjustment Assistance program for older displaced workers (age 50 or more) 
(Wandner 2013b). 
CGN recommends increased funding for ES and RES. They would 
require state implementation of STC and SEA programs. They also propose 
providing relocation allowances, apprenticeship stipends, referral to national 
service jobs, and SEA services, all funded from a portion (up to 10 percent) 
of an enhanced ES budget.
The WHO proposal recognizes statutory funding for ES through the 
Wagner-Peyser Act. The proposal would 1) not yield adequate funding for ES 
or for UI RES, 2) add potentially expensive and unproven wage insurance, 
and 3) not address SEA or reemployment bonuses. The CGN proposal for ES/
RES is sound, but the proposed use of enhanced ES funding (up to 10 percent 
of a new fund) is an unprecedented funding source for these initiatives. CGN 
does not propose reemployment bonuses.
Special Programs
All three proposals recommend that all states have statutory authori-
zation to permit employers to provide work-sharing payments through the 
UI system and that self-employment assistance be available for targeted UI 
benefi ciaries. 
The CGN proposal for a Job Seekers’ Allowance, which would program-
matically be a form of unemployment assistance, is not social insurance but 
rather a means-tested benefi t. Indeed, several CGN proposals for expanding 
the UI system go beyond the social insurance approach and, in some cases, 
look more like public assistance than social insurance.
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TRUMP WHITE HOUSE PROPOSALS
The following set of four UI reform legislative recommendations were 
presented in the Trump administration’s FY 2018 Budget (USDOL 2017b, 
p. 4): 
1) A proposal to establish a federal-state paid parental leave benefi t pro-
gram within the UI program that provides six weeks of benefi ts for 
mothers, fathers, and adoptive parents to help families recover from 
childbirth and to bond with their new children.
2) A proposal to reduce improper payments in the UI program with a 
package of reforms that would allow states to target more tools and 
resources toward the problem. 
3) An expansion of RESEA. This proposal would provide mandatory 
funding for states to provide RESEA to one-half of eligible UI claim-
ants, as well as all ex-military service members.
4) A minimum solvency standard that would apply the FUTA credit 
reduction rules to states that have an AHCM of less than 0.5 on Janu-
ary 1 of two consecutive years (rather than the current zero trust 
fund balance). This proposal would strengthen states’ ability to ade-
quately fund their UI systems.
Because these proposals were briefl y described in a budget document, 
have not been fl eshed out, and were presented without analysis by the Trump 
administration, we have considered them separately from the other more 
developed recent UI reform proposals. 
Parental Leave Proposal 
Most OECD countries off er parental leave benefi ts, and they have been 
found to be an eff ective policy to increase fertility (Lalive and Zweimuller 
2009). The proposal for parental leave therefore might be very good social 
policy, but paying benefi ts from the UTF for parental leave is currently not an 
allowable use of UI program funds. To protect the integrity of the UTF, state 
trust fund account reserves are paid by employer taxes on payrolls and may 
only be used to pay UI benefi ts. During periods of recession, state reserves 
are often not even suffi  cient to pay regular benefi ts to eligible UI applicants. 
Parental leave benefi ts would be a new entitlement with simple eligibility 
conditions, but for a parental benefi t to be sustainable, a new tax would be 
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required. Furthermore, either the UTF withdrawal rules would have to be 
statutorily revised, or a separate fund would have to be established with a 
new tax and a dedicated revenue stream. Actuarial computations of revenue 
adequacy for such a fund would require new behavioral analysis. Rough esti-
mates suggest that parental leave payments would have increased fund pay-
ments by at least 25 percent, or about $8 billion dollars, if it had been in place 
in 2017.2 
Improper Payment Proposal 
Improper UI payments are a serious problem, but they are inherent in 
any social insurance system and impossible to eliminate entirely. In a recent 
12-month period, 11.2 percent of all regular UI payments involved errors, 
and 10.6 percent of payments were incorrectly high (Gilbert 2011). However, 
even if all overpayments were eliminated, the savings would not be enough 
to pay for the proposed parental leave program.3 Overpayment errors have 
become a structural component of the UI system because of the federal rules 
relating to the initial eligibility of applicants. These rules are based on a 1970 
California state Supreme Court decision that ordered payment of benefi ts 
during appeal periods. USDOL has complied with this decision by apply-
ing it nationwide, such that administrative performance targets for timeliness 
require UI benefi t payments to be made when due and not delayed (O’Leary 
and Barnow 2016). 
The biggest cause of overpayment errors on continuing claims is the 
failure to fully comply with the UI work test (Burgess and Kingston 1987; 
Clarkwest et al. 2012). Expanded ES funding by USDOL to provide one-on-
one eligibility reviews to UI benefi ciaries should reduce work test overpay-
ments through the RESEA program, but since the Trump proposal would only 
provide RESEA to half of the WPRS group, RESEA still would not entirely 
eliminate overpayments. 
RESEA Proposal 
USDOL increased funding for the RESEA program in 2017 and pro-
vided grants to all states starting that year. The White House 2018 proposal 
aims to provide RESEA to the top 50 percent of WPRS-eligible UI benefi -
ciaries—that is, those neither awaiting employer recall nor union hiring hall 
members. Earlier research suggested that shorter UI durations from WPRS 
result from the unwelcome prospect of having to participate in services rather 
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than the actual content of those services (Black et al. 2003), but a more recent 
evaluation of the RESEA predecessor, REA, estimated signifi cantly shorter 
UI durations resulting from the RES component of REA (Michaelides et al. 
2012). RESEA off ers the prospect of reducing, but not eliminating, overpay-
ments on continuing UI claims. About half of UI recipients are subject to 
referral to WPRS services, and only about half of these will get RESEA. 
Furthermore, most state WPRS profi ling systems have not been updated in 
many years, so the top half of the profi ling distribution does not necessarily 
include those most likely to exhaust UI. 
Minimum Solvency Standard 
The Trump proposal would institute a federal rule that would reduce a 
state’s FUTA credit if the state’s AHCM for its reserves in the UTF is lower 
than 0.5 on two consecutive January fi rsts, which would nudge states toward 
forward funding of regular UI benefi ts. However, this would be only a par-
tial and probably an inadequate solution. The accepted standard for forward 
funding is an AHCM of 1.0. Relying on the FUTA credit reduction would 
be a slow mechanism to restore reserves. For example, after borrowing to 
pay benefi ts during the recent recession, 25 states experienced FUTA credit 
reductions in one or more year since 2009. In fact, 13 states had credit reduc-
tions in three or more consecutive years, with negative reserve balances on 
January fi rst.4 It is reasonable to conclude that these states consciously chose 
to let the FUTA credit reduction mechanism improve reserves instead of 
reforming their state benefi t fi nancing mechanisms. Credit reduction is a slow 
way to improve reserves because the FUTA TWB is only $7,000, and the 
statewide annual increment in the federal tax rate is only 0.3 percentage point. 
In fact, since 2011, two states have had FUTA credit reductions in place for 
seven consecutive years. The proposed USDOL solvency mechanism would 
be more eff ective if the FUTA TWB were increased. This also would improve 
benefi t fi nancing in states with TWBs below any new higher required federal 
level. A 0.5 AHCM is an inadequate forward funding standard and could pro-
long reliance on the federal credit reduction mechanism by some states. 
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Appendix 5B
Detailed Comparison of Unemployment Insurance Reform 
Proposals by O’Leary and Wandner (OW), the White 
House-Obama (WHO), and the Center for American 
Progress–Georgetown University–National Employment 
Law (CGN) 
Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN
Initial eligibility 
(number of states 
with this provi-
sion, if applicable)
Monetary criteria Dollars and high-
quarter earnings 
(HQ)
Dollars and HQ Weeks and HQ
Federal require-
ment that workers 
are eligible if they 
earn at least 300 
times the state’s 
hourly minimum 
wage during 
base period and 
worked in at least 
2 quarters. In the 
long run, require 






Require states to 
have an ABP
Require states to 
have an ABP
Require states to 
have an ABP
(continued)
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Proposals by UI 























due to “major life 
change.”
Part-time benefi t 
formula: allow 
claimants working 
part time to collect 
benefi ts as long as 
they are earning 
less than 150% of 
their weekly bene-




equal to 50% of 
the WBA (p. 63).
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Proposals by UI 









Require states to 
adopt for workers 
leaving jobs for 
compelling per-




selves or family 
member during 
illness or injury, 
providing child 
care when no al-
ternative arrange-
ment is available, 
and following 
spouse, partner, or 
co-parent. Federal 
government pays 
for these benefi ts 
and employers are 
not charged (pp. 
52, 77).
Require states to 
expand defi nition 




ratic job schedules 
or cut in hours and 
pay.
Require all states 
to eliminate eligi-
bility restrictions 
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Proposals by UI 




UI programs to 
provide methods 
for employer-fi led 
initial and con-
tinued claims for 
short-term layoff s 
and business shut-
downs, as well as 
work sharing (pp. 
67, 70).
Require states to 
notify all employ-
ees of potential 
UI eligibility fol-
lowing separation 




fi ling systems 
to comply with 
federal standards 
(p. 71).





wage level during 
regular UI benefi t 
period as duration 





to adopt an 
extended base 
period for workers 
with qualifying 
conditions, e.g., 
illness or injury. 
Also require an 
18-month base 
period for workers 
with an erratic 
work schedule.
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Proposals by UI 











UI benefi ciaries 




ment Services and 
Eligibility Assess-
ment (RESEA)
All EB recipients 
required to partici-
pate in RESEA




and suffi  ciency of 
ES staffi  ng
FUTA should 
fund ES at 1984 
levels in real 
terms. Supplemen-
tary funding for 
RESEA and other 
initiatives should 
be provided to all 
states.
Benefi t standards
Benefi t standards Require all states 
to replace 50% of 
lost wages, with 
maximum WBA 




to adopt federal 
benefi t standard 
using a new 
UI Moderniza-
tion program. 
$5 billion in 
grants for 1) 
benefi t expansion 
and 2) “pro-work 
reforms.” Benefi t 
expansions: 1) UI 
payments while 
in training and 2) 
maximum WBA of 
at least 2/3 AWW; 
improve eligibil-
ity for temporary 
workers.
Encourage states 
to adopt a 50% 
wage replace-
ment standard, 
with an indexed 
WBA equal to 
two-thirds of the 





25% of regular du-
ration greater than 
26 weeks up to 39 
weeks (p. 61).
(continued)
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Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN
Benefi t standards 
(cont.)
Require elimina-
tion of waiting 
week (p. 61).
Require lump-sum 
payments of UI 
benefi ts for “quali-









tion of at least 26 
weeks of benefi ts
Require states to 
have a maximum 
duration of at least 
26 weeks
Require all states 
to have uniform 
maximum duration 
(p. 60)
Partial UI benefi ts Allow claimants 
working part time 
to collect benefi ts 
as long as they 
are earning less 
than 150% of their 
WBA, disregard-
ing from this cal-
culation part-time 
wages equal to 










Fund up to 26 
weeks of addi-
tional UI benefi ts 
for workers in 
training
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Proposals by UI 






gible, continue to 
receive UI benefi ts 
while in OJT, 
other job training, 
or apprenticeship





7 weeks when 
6.5% TUR
13 weeks when 
7% TUR
26 weeks when 
8% TUR
39 weeks when 
9% TUR




13 weeks when 
6.5% TUR
26 weeks when 
7.5% TUR
39 weeks when 
8.5% TUR




13 weeks when 
6.5% TUR
26 weeks when 
7.5% TUR
39 weeks when 
8.5% TUR
52 weeks when 
9.5% TUR
Additional 6 
weeks of EB 
would be payable 
in states for each 
added one percent-
age point of TUR 
after 9.5.
Also a national 
TUR EB trigger 
should be enacted:
13 weeks when 
7% TUR
26 weeks when 
8% TUR
39 weeks when 
9% TUR
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Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN
Financing features
Minimum tax rates Encourage states 
to have a non-zero 
minimum rate 
Impose a mini-
mum tax per em-
ployee of 0.175%
Require a mini-
mum tax rate for 
all states (p. 78)
Number of rates Encourage states 
to have at least 10 






Range of rates Encourage states 
not to override 
triggers moving to 
higher schedules 
in response to 




Taxable wage base 
(TWB) 
Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act 
(FUTA) reforms
Congress should 
enact a FUTA 
TWB equal to 
33% of the Social 
Security TWB and 
then tie it to the 
Social Security 
index 
Eff ective 2018, the 
TWB would be 
$40K and there-
after indexed to in-
fl ation; federal tax 
reduced to 0.167% 
to be cost neutral 
in 2018
Over 6 years, 
raise UI TWB 
to one-half the 
SS TWB and 
thereafter growing 
at the rate of the 
SS TWB; federal 
tax reduced, while 
raising suffi  cient 
revenue to support 
an expanded role 






depending on state 
reserve balance 
in their trust fund 
accounts, increas-
ing the rate above 
the 10-year T-bill 
rate as the state 





reduction rules to 
states with average 
HCM < 0.5 in two 
consecutive years
HCM of 1.0 
required of all 




rate below which 
states’ tax revenue 
cannot fall (p. 76). 
Pay diff erentially 
higher interest 
rate payments to 
states that exceed 
the target average 
HCM (p. 78).
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Proposals by UI 





to calendar year 
wages to employ-
ers of multiple job 
holders
At end of year, 
reconcile tax pay-
ments for workers 
who have held 
more than one job 












when suffi  cient, 
otherwise from 
General Fund
Full funding of EB 
by federal govern-
ment




funding for UI 
administration, 
including all 
components of the 
program, includ-




ments in all states.
FUTA funds ES in 
real terms at the 
1984 level, then 
indexed at the rate 










Fully fund UI 
administra-
tive funding by 
increasing by $600 
million over the 
next 3 years. After 
3 years, implement 
updated admin-
istrative formula 








one-time grants of 
$300 million for 
IT upgrades and 
updating worker 
profi ling models. 
Increase federal 
oversight of UI 
IT systems and 
institute federal 
UI IT audits (pp. 
69–71).
(continued)
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Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN





funding should be 
about $400–500 
million, then 
indexed at the rate 
of increase of the 
Social Security 
TWB. Funding 
as part of WPRS 
from FUTA pro-
vided to ES.
Appropriate a total 
of $1.68 billion 
(an additional $1 
billion) for ES for 
FY 2017 (p. 21).
Appropriate 
$650 million (an 
additional $535 
million) for RE-






All states should 
be encouraged 
to adopt and 
make use of STC 
programs. New 







funding for STC 
and consider 
relieving employ-
ers of the cost of 
STC.
Incentives to adopt 
or expand for 2 




benefi ts, $100 mil-
lion in implemen-
tation grants
While on EB, 
50–50 split of 
costs between 
federal and state 
and non-charge of 
the federal share
Require all states 
to create an STC 
program. Provide 
federal grants for 
implementation 
and marketing for 
new states. 100% 
federal funding 
for at least 1 year 
when states are 
on EB. Federal 
STC automation 
grants. States 
encouraged not to 




to adopt best 
practices.
Full funding of 
STC by federal 
government when-
ever EB trigger 
is on, whether 
state or nationally 
triggered. States 
should not experi-
ence rate STC 
benefi ts during 
federal reimburse-
ment period.
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Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN
Self-employment 
assistance (SEA)
All states should 
be encouraged to 




Act and Small 
Business Admin-
istration should 
be required to 
provide entrepre-
neurial training to 
SEA participants.
All states should 
establish SEA 
programs.
All states should 








claim up to half 
of their remaining 
UI entitlement up-






ment Act of 1994 
should permit 





Wage insurance USDOL should 
conduct a wage 
insurance dem-
onstration project 
for this untested 
initiative.
For workers with 
3 years of tenure, 
earning less than 
$50,000. Pay half 
of wage reduction 




Use ES funding 
to fund relocation 
allowances, as a 
lump sum up to 3 
times the average 
WBA, capped at 
a maximum of 
$2,000 per year.
(continued)
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Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN
Supportive 





tional service jobs 
(funding source 







services could be 
funded with up to 









tent workers with 
limited resources.
UI program policy 
research
USDOL should 
support fi eld tests 
of policy innova-
tions, establish a 
repository for state 
administrative 
data to support 
program policy 
research, and es-
tablish 6 regional 
research hubs for 
research including 
biennial revisions 
of state WPRS 
models.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation; White House (2017); West et al. (2016).
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Appendix Notes
 
 1. The White House-Obama (WHO) proposal was published in White 
House (2017), and the Center for American Progress (CAP) proposal 
was published in West et al. (2016).  
 2. There were just under 4 million live births in the United States in 2015, 
the average UI weekly benefi t amount was $347 in the 12 months pre-
ceding April 1, 2017, and assuming every child had one parent collect 6 
weeks of parental leave benefi ts, the payments would total $8.3 billion 
per year. Total UI payments in the year prior to April 1, 2017, were 
$31.2 billion. Parental leave payments would be higher if more than 
one parent draws benefi ts, and payments would be lower if the duration 
of parental leave were less than six weeks or if the take-up rate were 
less than 100 percent (as it is for regular UI payments). Our computa-
tions are based on fi gures from cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm and ows
.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/data.asp (accessed April 26, 2018). 
 3. For 2016, overpayments were estimated to total $3.4 billion (USDOL 
2017a). 
 4. See the Table of States with FUTA Reductions, 2009–2017 at: https://
oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/futa_credit.asp (accessed April 26, 2018). 
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